Modern
history (some of it as recent as yesterday's front page news),
is, because of its implications for the present, surely the
most sensitive amongst all historical topics. Something which
seems certain today can be shown to have been completely wrong
and a case of failed judgement after new facts, unknown documents
or somebody's memoirs, come to light. But things can look
like this only if certain events (which look to be turning
points) are observed in isolation. If we focus away from the
single event which was the big news and we look at it in the
context of a global trend , we can more safely and accurately
draw conclusions from it.
One of
such occurences which has to be observed outside of the context
of an exclusive news, is the policy of the Croatian leadership
towards the crisis and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is constant debate concerning this question in the Croatian
society, and the policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, was,
so to speak, the key reason for the split in the leading political
party , and a permanent stumbling block between the country's
leadership and the greater part of the political opposition.
A brief reminder - the leadership opted for a clear and a
transparent policy towards everything that was happening in
Bosnia since the outbreak of the crisis. The key underlying
theme of that policy, was and remained the support for the
part of Croatian national corps which lives in that country
in an effort to ensure territorial autonomy and an affirmation
of its constituent position. In other words: from the begining,
the support was given to the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in order to defend and ensure the complete control of that
part of the territory where they represent the majority, and
then, from that position to approach negotiations for the
internal organisation of that country.
The opponents
of this policy represented the attitude where the constitutive
position of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in any case
guaranteed by the constitution, and according to them, it
was unneccessary, even counterproductive to insist on the
principle of the territorial autonomy. In other words, those
that hold this view, concluded that this policy, which insists
on the defence of the territories where the Croats are a major
element, only serve to antagonise the Bosnian Muslim side.
They maintain that the policy led by the Croatian leadership
was the main reason for the breaking out of the Muslim- Croatian
conflict in 1993. If an alternative policy had been taken
from the start by the Croatian side, the one that called for
the defence of the existing constitutional-legal position
on the whole teritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a strategic
aliliance could have been struck with the Bosnian Muslim side
(often it was spoken about a "natural alliance")
against the Serbian, the agressor's side.
Even at
the first glance it's easy to conclude that this is an almost
academic discussion about a question to which there is no
simple answer. In fact, the answer to this set doubt is not
possible to achieve if we don't take into account the position
of the other, Bosnian Muslim side. As every alliance needs
active cooperation of both sides, it is obvious that this
kind of a partnership isn't possible without a minimum consensus.
It remains an open issue how to interpret certain statements
and spoken words - should we take statements at their face
value without critically examining them or should we pay more
attention to actions rather than words. In precisely this
context, we need a reminder, (although many of us remember
it very well), of the statement by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic dating
back to the period of the fiercest Serbian agression on Croatia,
by which he called on his followers to be passive, declaring
how the "Croatian-Serbian conflict" (his "explanation"
of the nature of the aggression) "isn't our war".
In the period of the worst agression on Vukovar, when even
the blind knew what was going on, Mr. Izetbegovic claimed
on Sarajevo's TV that there was no difference between the
Serbian and the Croatian side, that it is in fact all propaganda,
and he praised local Sarajevo's media (mostly under the Serbian
control then) who represented everything what's happened in
Croatia as "civil war".
Explanations
that even today reach Croatian public (not to mention the
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina) elucidate that this kind
of behaviour was an attempt by the Bosnian Muslim leadership
to avoid conflict on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However an attentive observer could have even then seen clearly
that the attitude of the president of the rotating presidency
of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had rather
poor repercussions among the local Croats. A direct consequence
of his conduct was the accelerated process of decomposition
of the social and ethnic/national fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The process advanced very quickly, so that by the end of 1991,
the crew of Sarajevo's TV-station was not allowed to enter
the parts of Bosnia which were Croat majority areas (not to
mention the parts of the Republic with a Serb majority - the
places from where the war against Croatia was being fought).
By all means, the complete destruction of the social fabric
cannnot all be declared as a consequence of statements, not
even actions of a certain political leader or wider circle
surrounding the leader. However, the fact remains that, as
far as the Bosnian Muslim side is concerned, there was not
a single move directed to stop the process of destruction.
Today,
the situation is observed from a different point of view.
Substantial new evidence, in form of written memoirs, belonging
to Bosnian Muslims that took part in the events concerned,
is at our disposal.
First
of all, it is simply not possible any more to argue the idea
according to which all of these and similar attitudes and
actions of Bosnian Muslim politicians were only naive strivings
to prevent the breakout of war in Bosnia. It is enough to
read the printed memoirs of several of the highest ranking
officers of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina or high ranking
Sarajevo officials to realize that there weren't really any
misunderstandings of the situation or naive perceptions of
events. It is also glaringly obvious for all to see that incompetence
and dilettantism were thriving amongst the Bosnian Muslim
political elite, and as a result, the Bosnian Muslim people
paid a heavy price.
The situation
becomes quite clear after closer scrutiny of a substantial
interview given by the commander of Muslim armed forces, Mr.
Sefer Halilovic in the spring of the last year, 1995, for
Sarajevo's monthly magazine "Dani". This former
major of the Yugoslav Army has stirred up a lot of controversies
in the past. Mr Halilovic was at one time even withdrawn from
the position of the chief commander of the Muslim "Armija
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine" (Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and he remained under house arrest
for a period of time. Today, Mr Halilovic is the first man
of "Bosanska Patriotska Stranka" (Bosnian Patriot
Party), which almost exclusively gathers Muslims from Sandzak
(a majority Muslim region in Serbia), from where he himself
hails. The political platform of the party practically ignores
the Dayton Peace Accord, considering that it destroys the
concept of the "civil state" for which Mr. Halilovic
and like-minded individuals fought for from the beginning.
The views
expressed by the founder of the Patriotska liga (Patriotic
league) and the first commander of the Army, in the longish
interview can be regarded as typical for a whole layer of
ex Muslim officers of the Yugoslav Army which, (after May
1992) expressed their loyalty to the government in Sarajevo.
They represented the pillars of the Army created by the newly
founded state. Bearing that fact in mind, it is more than
indicative to analyse just how Mr. Halilovic explains events
in the time of brewing of the Yugoslav crisis beginning from
1990. Mr Halilovic, at the time attended an army officer school
of the Yugoslav People's Army in Belgrade and served in Croatia
(Djakovo). According to his own words, he had the opportunity
to observe "how Chetnik's ideology is forming in Serbia
from Monday to Friday, and from Friday to Monday he watched
how Ustasha ideology is taking shape in Croatia". Given
the fact that Mr. Halilovic was an officer schooled in "the
centers for brainwashing" pertaining to the Yugoslav
Army, nothing more can be expected from his mental framework
than stereotypic "partisan" black-and-white division:
those who accepted Yugoslavia were positive and therefore
acceptable, those against Yugoslavia could only be termed
as "Chetniks" and "Ustashe", ie. extremist
Serb and Croat nationalists. Mr. Halilovic, already carrying
this bag of convictions, could not help but feel the attitudes
and words already stated by the president of the presidency
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as heaven-sent.
And really,
the major (at the time) in May of 1991, by means of relatives
in Sarajevo placed himself at the disposal of the political
organization run by Izetbegovic and his "Stranka Demokratske
Akcije" (Party of Democratic Action). In August of the
same year he moved to Sarajevo permanently (of course, in
the interview, he experienced "amnesia" of some
sort, regarding his actions in the period from May to August
of 1991, while he was still an active officer of the Yugoslav
Army in Djakovo - material which may one day be interesting
to the judicial system of the Republic of Croatia). After
that period, he uses all the strength available to organize
and create the "Patriotic league", a party militia
organization in the classic sense of the word.
The fact
that needs to be particularly stressed, neglecting many unimportant
details, is that among numerous persons with whom he maintained
contacts during this process and whose names are mentioned
in the interview, there is not a single non-Muslim individual.
Not even the Bosnian Minister of Defense of the period, Mr.
Jerko Doko is mentioned. Doko was a man who belonged to the
group of Croatian politicians who believed that unity with
the Muslims is the only possible direction of the Croatian
politics in Bosnia. Although Mr. Halilovic himself was the
leader of a completely illegal party militia (which would
later assume the name "Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina")
that relied exclusively upon one of the three of Bosnia's
constituent peoples, he, without any restrictions whatsoever,
accuses the "Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane" - HVO (Croatian
Council of Defense) as being exclusively a militia controlled
by the "Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica" - HDZ (Croatian
Democratic Union - the chief Bosnian Croat political party).
At the same time he views his own position as completely legitimate
and legal, claiming that it was upon him to organize "the
concept of defense of Sarajevo and the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina".
Mr Halilovic's
revelation about the definition of formulated structure of
the "Territorial Defense" should be observed in
the same context. It is the first millitary formation behind
which stood legitimacy and legality of the Bosnian Presidency
of the time. Congruently to the public proclamations about
"multiethnic, multicultural and democratic nature"
of the regime in Sarajevo, general Hasan Efendic was appointed
a commander of the Republic's headquarters of Territorrial
Defense in the beginning of April of 1992, the place of his
substitute belonged to a Serb, a colonel Jovo Divjak, and
the place of the chief of staff was given to a Croatian colonel
Stjepan Siber.
These
appointments, as the records would show later on, were only
formality, conceived, as Mr. Halilovic explains, "because
of legalization". A command conveyed by one of the ministers
in the government of the time and coming from the highest
political level , hence from Mr. Izetbegovic, to the leadership
of the Patriotic league at the period of the performed appointments
runs like this: "you just keep on operating and let them
(Divjak and Siber) just sit there". Congruently to the
order Mr. Halilovic continues to recall and explains "there
aren't any problems, however until we acquire confidence in
the people who are coming, we will not give information that
might prove to be important".
Everything
thus stated clearly defines the position of the Muslim political
and millitary leadership at the time. There are official attitudes
and public statements about "united, multiethnic, multicultural
Bosnia and democratic principles". On the other hand,
however, the action is reduced to complete disorder and chaos
(parallel commanding structures between which confidence and
communication do not exist!), usurpation and creating of parallel
military machinery and authority as well as complete shoving
and excommunication of everything that does not have Muslim
characteristics. It is not difficult to prove how even at
that time the information that reached Zagreb, that is the
Croatian authorities and relevant political factors, presented
the situation in Bosnia exactly as it was. However, Muslim
rhetoric, that directly found its support in the heritage
of "self-managerial socialism" mindset proved too
attractive for a substantial part of participants belonging
to Croatian political scene: Socijaldemokratska Partija-SDP
(Social Democratic Party), a current in HDZ represented by
Mesic and Manolic, Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka-HSLS
(Croatian Social Liberal Party) etc. After all, during the
period of socialism what was being said was always more important
than what was actually being done.
As far
as the initial question is concerned, the one about correctness
of the policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina which was chosen
by the Croatian authorities, it seems that after everything
that has been said here, the question formulated in that manner
loses its meaning. Having as a partner the Muslim authorities
in Sarajevo in 1991/1992 - the only thing that could have
been "agreed" on with them, would have been an agreement
about the complete surrender of the local Croatian people.
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