Još se jednom pokazalo tko vjeruje Rusima, završi znamo već kako, ovo su dobro iskusili svi istočni Europljani, Assada se sad prisiljava da potpiše primirje i prizna pobunjenike.

Povlače se sad kad je ID pred raspadom, ovako trećina Sirije vjerojatno kroz pregovore postaje entitet polupriznati kalifat očišćen od nesunitskog koji će onda skupljati i obučavati islamističke ekstremiste pa će onda ovi harati po zapadnoj Europi što Rusiji i odgovara.

Sirija ostaje ovo što drži Assad, Kurdima neki tip samouprave i eto od Sirije nove BiH, samo mi se čini da će Kurdi spušiti u miru kad ih stisnu Ameri i Turci kao što smo i mi popušili.

CIA has ignored intelligence on ISIS since 2013 and could have halted its rise when it only had a handful of recruits, Syrian rebel spy chief claims

By COREY CHARLTON FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 11:48 GMT, 16 March 2016 | UPDATED: 16:24 GMT, 16 March 2016

The CIA has ignored crucial intelligence since 2013 from within ISIS ranks that could have helped prevent its rise, a Syrian rebel spy chief has claimed.

The Free Syrian Army spy boss said he had been sending reports to his CIA contacts for more than two years that included GPS coordinates, ISIS movements, photographs and phone numbers.

His operation - which utilizes 30 operatives placed inside ISIS-controlled cities - was 'trained abroad' and received $10,000 per month from the U.S. government, he claimed.

The spy chief, interviewed by Le Monde and named only as 'M', said: 'From the moment [ISIS] had 20 members to when it had 20,000, we have shown everything to the Americans', RT reported.

'When we asked them what they did with this information, they always gave evasive answers, saying it was in the hands of decision-makers.

'My agents also managed to get hold of phone numbers of ISIS officials, serial numbers of satellite equipment and IP addresses. But once again, zero response.'

Among the intelligence details cited were a photograph and GPS coordinates of a secret ISIS training camp in Latakia Province, Syria.

Another document was 2014 a battle plan designed to expel ISIS from Aleppo. However, it revealed the attack was postponed several times by the U.S. before a counter attack from Al Qaeda's Al-Nusra Front scuppered it.

Šta, možda i Putin želi nobela kao i Obama.

Snimak od juče: SAA tuče VBR-ovima po isis-drekavcima

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=18a_1458260528

Making sense of Turkey’s shift to Iran

After experimenting with taking a belligerent stance on the Syrian question, Turkey seems to be shifting to diplomacy once again. This shift does make sense given that belligerence has cost Turkey a lot. On the domestic front, Turkey has had to face a reasonably organized Kurdish resistance. On the external front, its un-necessary belligerence has cost her relations with Russia, ending up in the form of Russian sanctions on Turkey. Two factors seem to have pushed Turkey to make this shift. First, it has failed to achieve its basic objective vis-à-vis Syria i.e., territorial disintegration of Syria by carving it into “zones.” Second, it has failed to push Russia off the ground through deliberate provocations. In addition to it, Russian sanctions have certainly put constraints on easy supply of energy resources to Turkey, causing damage to its economy. Hence, Turkey’s shift to Iran to seek alternative sources of oil and gas.
It is in this context of multiple failures that we must read Turkey’s ‘positive’ diplomatic overtures to Iran. As such, following the recent consultations between the two foreign ministries in Ankara, Turkey and Iran have decided to reset their bilateral ties. Iran is confident that Turkey has lost the war in Syria and a new phase in Ankara’s policies is about to begin. Some recent developments on the war-front indicate this failure clearly. In addition to it, Turkey is a well-established market that the Iranian economy can earn substantial money from. Hence, Iran’s emphasis on bolstering economic ties.

However, for Turkey, not only can Iran be a source of supply of oil and gas but also be used to settle the Kurdish question in favour of Turkey. Apart from it, Turkish business elite sees in Iran, just like the European entrepreneurs, a big market to invest in. For Turkey Iranian market has an additional element of significance: assess to it can allow Turkey to make amends for the losses it has suffered and continues to suffer due to strained relations with Russia.

Considering the potential benefits, it was but natural to see Turkey making a drastic change in its erstwhile position on Syria. Instead of paving the way for a ground invasion of Syria, Turkey is now explicitly favouring a sort of ‘political settlement’ of the crisis. The change clearly reflected during Turkish Prime Minister’s most recent visit to Iran. After returning to Ankara, Davutoglu made a startling remark that Turkey and Iran have reached an agreement on the settlement of the Syrian issue. He said, “We don’t want Syria to be divided into smaller states and we reached an agreement with the Iranian officials that this disintegration won’t happen and that Syria would continue its life and presence as a powerful country.”

This freshly designed Turkish position on Syria is something Iran has been advocating not only with regard to Syria but also Iraq and Kurds. During his visit to Turkey in the month of February, the Iranian diplomat thus stated Iran’s position vis-à-vis the wider regional problem, “Kurds are our historical friends. And we want them to continue their existence in prosperity and happiness within the states they live in. Our region is not strong enough to bear new crises. We hope Kurds in other countries will enjoy full citizenship rights as Kurds in Iran do. And if we defend the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran, we do the same for Iraq and Syria as well.”

On the surface, Iran’s position is favourable to Turkish interests. Clearly, Iran is far from supporting an ‘independent’ Kurdish state in the Middle East. And, this is precisely what Turkey has been resisting through years.

The Iranian official unambiguously underscored that Iran and Turkey are on the same page on the Kurdish question and Ankara can count on Tehran to do all that is necessary to prevent the emergence of an ‘independent Kurdistan’ anywhere on the region’s map – be it inside or outside Turkey or along Turkey’s borders or in its neighborhood. Iran understands that a Kurdish state would certainly stir its own Kurdish population, leading to the emergence of an un-necessary political nuance at home. Hence, Iran’s advocacy of granting ‘citizenship rights’ to Kurds where ever they happen to have presence in the region.

However, despite the apparent Turkish-Iranian rapprochement over the Syrian and Kurdish question, differences continue to exist at some level. This is due to the fact that Iranian-Turkish rapprochement is not so strong as it looks on paper. The current gestures can be explained as both countries’ assessments about the potential benefits they can have by revamping their relations.

These differences were quite explicit even during the recent bi-lateral visits of Turkish and Iranian officials. For instance, No sooner did Davutoglu leave Iran for home than Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian (who is Iran’s point person on the conflict in Syria) briefed the Majlis’ National Security and Foreign Policy Commission that Turkey’s Syria policies have failed, but Ankara is still pressing ahead with policies aimed at the overthrow of the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US.

The Iranian officials did not shy of mentioning to the Turkish officials their disagreement with the way some regional countries, especially Saudi Arabia, continue to back proxy groups to create tension in the region. Similarly, Iran’s official media also continued to reinstate Turkey’s role in creating the same geo-political tensions.

These differences notwithstanding, Iran still understands that it has more shared interests with Turkey than it could possibly have with any other regional power, especially Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies. The convergence of interests is, however, primarily in the economic domain as both need each other for different reasons. Geo-political tension amid the struggle for regional supremacy continues to exist between them, although both countries seem willing to put it on the backburner for some time at least.

Therefore, with an eye on the future, Iran visualizes that an extension of the gas pipeline connecting Turkey to Europe might be a feasible option to promote its gas exports to a lucrative market. On the other hand, such supply of energy resources from Iran would certainly help Turkey reduce its heavy dependence of Russia. As such, while geo-economics does seem to be making sense to both the countries, geo-strategy continues to cast dark shadows on the prospects of translating this prospective economic relation into a well-shaped strategic alliance.

Jako loš analitičar. Gazprom nije Turcima nimalo smanjio dotok plina jer ne smiju zbog odšteta koji bi plaćali i ugovora kojeg su potpisali.
Sklepaj portal i glumi "analitičara". Kao i ljudi na forumu. Nešto pogodiš, većinu fulaš.

Ne radi se o tome. Čitaj svoje štivo koje kopiraš. "Analitičar" misli da je Turska već propatila jer im Rusi smanjili plin, što nije istina.

Ne ću bit grammar nazi. Shvaćam šta je pjesnik htio reć. Turci traže sigurnog dobavljača. Zaključak je točan, iako je jedna premisa manjkava u vremenskoj odrednici - ekonomija pati ili će da pati. Irelevantno.