pa naravno da imaju potporu, Talibani su Paštunci, to je pod navodnicima nacionalni pokret Paštuna, zato su prisutni i u Pakistanu, a bome zato su i nepobjedivi u smislu da ih se može satrati do zadnjeg kad proizlaze iz paštunskog naroda čiji se broj mjeri u desetinama milijuna.

Karta je malo čudna. Po ovome, Talibani kontroliraju okolicu doline Panjshir, područje koje jedino nisu držali krajem devedesetih. To je sjedište Massoudovih Tadžika.

The Taliban in Afghanistan’s once impregnable Panjshir Valley

Last month driving up Afghanistan’s magnificent Panjshir valley, you couldn’t help thinking if the resurgent Taliban would ever be able to break its defences, both natural and from the Tajik-dominated populace. With its jagged cliffs and plunging valleys, Panjshir has been largely out of bounds for the Taliban, whether during the civil war or in the past 10 years when it has expanded a deadly insurgency against western and Afghan forces across the country. But on Saturday, the insurgents struck, carrying out a suicide bombing at a provincial reconstruction team base housing U.S. and Afghan troops and officials.

The Taliban claimed responsibility, saying the first suicide bombing in a decade was a message to Western forces that they were not secure anywhere in the country. They said the bombers came from within Panjshir, which if true would worry people even more because that would suggest the penetration was deeper and there could be more attacks.

Here's the Most Disturbing Thing About the Taliban Takeover of Kunduz

The Taliban is gaining currency outside of its traditional Pashtun base. This is troubling.

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri
October 02, 2015

The recent fall of the northern Afghan city of the Kunduz to the Taliban–which has since been mostly recaptured by Afghan government forces–highlighted some disturbing trends in the security situation in that country. The two trends that stand out the most are related to each other: the rise of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan and the expansion of the movement beyond its ethnic Pashtun base in southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan.

On Thursday, despite losing Kunduz, the Taliban allegedly captured the Warduj district of Badakhshan, according to Fawzia Koofi, an Afghan lawmaker. This is significant because Badakhshan is the one province of Afghanistan that was completely free of Taliban rule before 2001, being the stronghold of the Northern Alliance. The district in particular was the stronghold of the Jamiat-e Islami, led by the ethnic-Tajik, pre-Taliban President of Afghanistan from 1992-1996, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Yet, the rise of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan has been a long time in coming. After the departure of NATO forces from the area in 2013, the power of the Taliban began to grow in the north.

The reasons for this are threefold. First, pure practicality. It was easier for Taliban forces to regroup and take territory in the north since most NATO and Afghan operations were focused on the south and east.

Second, capturing the north became strategically important for the Taliban because their military position would always be tenuous without control over the north, a recruiting ground for Afghan soldiers and a bastion of forces loyal to the Afghan government. Finally, the Taliban has begun recruiting among predominantly the non-Pashtun groups of the north.

This third reason–non-Pashtuns joining the Taliban in large numbers–is the most significant, because it represents a major change in Taliban’s overall strategy. Previous Taliban campaigns in the north during their takeover of Afghanistan between 1996-2001 often featured mostly Pashtun units taking over resentful Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek populations. A lack of popular support among ethnic groups in the north was a factor in their quick collapse there and the relative peace of the north for a decade after. However, by recruiting northerners, the Taliban may now be establishing deeper roots there, which will make uprooting them thoroughly much more difficult in the future.

Many prominent government figures are from the north, such as Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, and Chief Executive Officer, Abdullah Abdullah, a (half) Tajik. Despite this shared ethnicity, many northerners have complained about government neglect, corruption, and a lack of services. The alleged shadow Taliban governor of Badakhshan since 2013, ethnic-Tajik Qari Fasihuddin, took up arms because of harassment by Afghan security forces, especially of religious scholars. Much of the local rank and file of the police forces in the region also turned against their commanders for similar reasons. According to The New York Times, the Taliban specifically sought out the support of Tajiks and Uzbeks, often by supporting dissatisfied ethnic leaders.

The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns

Abstract
Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement
in terms of their composition, they have started making
significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many
cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits,
disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other
organizations, and the relationship between them is far
from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of
grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically
committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While
even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency
is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be
underestimated.

Nisam baš pratio zadnjih nekoliko godina, no ovo je jako loše, mada još uvijek oslonjeno na Paštunce. Afganistanu zapravo najviše nedostaje pravi nekorumpirani vođa oko kojeg bi se okupljali protivnici Talibana. Ghani to nije.

Massoud je svojedobno bio popularan i poštovan i kod mnogih pripadnika drugih naroda, ne samo Tadžika.

Massouda su likvidirali al-Qaidini operativci iz Belgije, iz četvrti Molenbeek u Bruxellesu.

Uopće ne vidim tog antitalibanskog vođu koji bi mogao ujediniti Afganistan.

Predsjednik Ashraf Ghani je izvan Afganistana proveo 24 godine, od 1977.-2001. i došao je s američkim okupatorima koji su zbacili među Paštuncima popularan talibanski režim. Njegova supruga je libanonska kršćanka. A kćer mu je feministkinja.

Premijer dr. Abdullah Abdullah je sin Paštunca i Tadžikinje. Za razliku od Ghanija sudjelovao je u mudžahedinskom otporu Sovjetima od 1985., na strani Ahmeda Shaha Masssouda.
I on je kompromitiran u očima većine Paštunaca time što je bio ministar vanjskih poslova u vladi Burhanuddina Rabbanija.

Uvjeren sam da će kada Amerikanci obustave dotok novca afganistanskoj Vladi i povuku vlastite oružane snage iz Afganistana, talibani umarširati u Kabul.

Ne vidim ni ja. Massoud je ubijen dva dana prije 9/11, što je očito bilo namjerno tempirano. Velika šteta za Afganistan.

Over the past seven years, however, an archival project took shape, culminating in the Taliban Sources Project. It has been tremendously challenging to collect, digitise and translate the Taleban’s written output over the years. The authors’ initial motivation was that it would stimulate new research into the movement’s history. As the authors collected more, they thought it was worth trying to examine the ways in which the Taleban’s ideology had changed over time.

The documents and interviews challenge three conventional notions of Taleban ideology:

That the Taleban’s ideology is a mechanical, literalist interpretation of Islam that has not changed in over thirty years.
That the Taleban’s ideology was born in Pakistani refugee camps, and represents a phenomenon alien to Afghan society.
That the Taleban’s ideology represents a form of Deobandism (or, in some variants, Wahhabism) that stands in opposition to Sufism and other religious tendencies prevalent in Afghan society.

The main conclusions drawn in the paper are that the Afghan Taleban’s ideology is
a) the result of a sophisticated internal logic that has changed in subtle but important ways over the years,
b) the origins of the Taleban’s ideology lie in the southern Pashtun village, not the Pakistani refugee camp, and
3) their thinking is heavily infused with Sufism.

A koji narod govori dari jezik i je li to istovjetsn jezik perzijskom? Jesu li ti ujedno i šijiti jer znam da oni čine 20% populacije.

Prostor talibanske aktivnosti se poklapa s Paštunistanom i s područjima na koja su Paštunci kolonizirani u sjevernom Afganistanu.

Svi vođe talibana i u Afganistanu i u Pakistanu su Paštunci.

Kada su talibani vladali Afganistanom od 1994.-2001. dobar dio njihovih pravila je bio utemeljen u paštunskim plemenskim običajima, a ne samo u šerijatu.

Zapravo i samo ime Afganistan potječe od drugog naziva za Paštunce, Afganci. Dakle, Paštunci imaju i državotvornu crtu.

Amerikanci su izdržali duže od Britanaca i Rusa u Afganistanu, ali talibani će na kraju pobijediti upravo zbog toga što je paštunsko stanovništvo većinom na njihovoj strani, a afganistansku vlast u paštunskim pokrajinama uglavnom čine kolaboranti s mrskim Zapadnjacima.

Talibani već sada drže niz gradova u svojim rukama, u kojima održavaju javne vojne parade. Dakle, više nije riječ o običnoj gerili već o pravom ustanku.

Zanimljivost je da Paštunci uriniraju čučeći, a Uzbeci iz sjevernog Afganistana uriniraju stojeći.

Prije nastanka države Izrael, Paštunci su se negdje od 16. stoljeća u svojim genealogijama proglašavali potomcima izraelskih plemena preko Jakova (Jakuba), Josipa (Jusufa), Mojsija (Muse), Šaula (Taluta) i Salomona (Sulejmana).

I koji je zakljucak, trebace da se bombarduje cucopisljive talibanske pastunce?
Treba negde da se isproba hellfire i sve ostalo

Afganistan je prije dolaska Islama bila većinski budističke zemlja, a Pakistan hinduistička. Možda bi bilo najpametnije da se Talibanima ostavi vlast u Afganistanu samo kako bi njihovim kolonizatorima u Europi moglo osporiti azil i omogućiti lakšu deportaciju. Talibani čekaju kada će se Ameri povući kako bi mirno mogli uštetati u glavni grad. Alternativno bi bilo vratiti monarhiju i prijestolonasljednika kojeg su afganistanski komunisti zbacili sa vlasti.

Čitam trenutno knjigu o zbivanjima neposredno prije, za vrijeme, i poslije sovjetske okupacije Afganistana.
Došao sam do toga kad su se Rusi vratili doma krkani Amerikanci su po ludoj inerciji nastavili sa svojim sranjima da spriječe bilo kakvu normalnu lokalnu vladu i ustoliče u Kabulu najveće islamske manijake Saudijce i ostale. Pakistanska tajna služba im dobro podvalila. Dijelili oružje i novac uglavnom najvećim islamskim manijacima.

Samo jedan US diplomat ih upozoravao koga dovode na vlast i da ti mrze Amerikance neviđenim intenzitetom i da će se poslije baviti terorizmom. 3 agencije, silne milijarde $ niko to nije ni želio vidjeti ni vidio da dolazi.
Taj diplomat je na svoju ruku nekoliko tjedana putovao granicom sa Afganistanom pa ulazio i unutra i pričao sa svim Afganistancima koje je sreo. Lideri plemena u egzilu, izbjeglice, svašta nešto. Skoro svi mu govorili da nisu (Amerikanci) normalni jer pomažu specifičnu grupaciju Arapa koji ih posebno mrze. Uz ostale konkretne detalje naravno.

Gorbačev, ruski ministar vanjskih, ruski šef KGB-a. Svi dolazili u USA njima na noge da im kažu da će napustiti Afganistan i molili Amerikance da im pomognu sastaviti vladu od šefova lokalnih plemena. Upozoravali ih da te koje naoružavaju i daju im novac planiraju radikalnu islamsku državu i da će biti opasnost svima u susjedstvu i dalje. Ali eto, ovi imali svoje "analize" i mislili da Rusi blefiraju. Nekoliko tjedana iza toga ruske kolone krenule prema granici, kraj rata.

I ta priča je samo pokazatelj koliko je KGB uvijek bio kvalitetnija agencija. Nevezano za to čiji pakt se na kraju raspao.