Putin je ono što Rusi žele da bude. Tita niko nikad nije birao za lidera.

Reagiraš preburno na bilo što pozitivnije napisano o Rusima.

Naporan si, Te etikete kao kad muslimani dijele okolo "fašistima", "četnicima" i "ustašama".

Čuj "autokratskoj".
Onda na drugoj temi braniš namještanje izbora Bidenu i cenzuru drugačijeg mišljenja u USA.

Je li se slažeš da je Putin Rusiji ono što je Tito bio Jugoslaviji.

Neosporna je popularnost, neosporan je određeni uspjeh na mnogim poljima, ali isto tako je nesporna i autokracija, nastavak stoljetne korupcije i nepotizma, nastavak tradicije upotrebe represivnog aparata prema pripadnicima vlastitog naroda koji imaju neke druge ideje i mišljenja, nedemokratski sistem (ne smatram da je demokracija sveta i idealna, jer isto kao što ne može svatko voziti avion nije ni svatko jednako politički pismen a svaki glas jednako vrijedi, ali Rusi su dovoljno obrazovan narod da mogu imati demokraciju umjesto cara).

Putin je jednostavno ruski car, kao što je Tito bio jugoslavenski car.

U biti dobro ste rekli da je Rusija uvijek imala cara, i kad su cara skinuli bio je komunistički car, demokracija je jedino bila nakratko za vrijeme slabog Jeljcina. Ljudi očito ne znaju organizirati jedan transparentan i funkcionirajući sistem gdje je moguće imati više od 1 stava i mišljenja i gdje se provodi javna rasprava.

To je zato što Rusi imaju ogromnu dijasporu na zapadu, koja je u zadnjih 100 godina iseljavala radi lošeg života pod režimom.

Oporba ima veze s njima.

Prema ruskom narodu imam velikog poštovanja, a bome odajem respekt i sistemu u jednom dijelu, posebno vojnoj moći njihovog sistema, a ovdje ćemo diskutirati je li takvu moć moguće imati bez ludog cara na čelu i je li uvijek cijena mora biti život pod nekim Staljinom.

Znači, nemoguće je imati suverenu zemlju bez nekog Kim Jong Ila na njenom čelu ?

Russian construction mogul Arkady Rotenberg says he's the beneficiary of an extensive property on the Black Sea coast, which has been widely touted by Alexey Navalny and Western media as a secret residence of Vladimir Putin.
The businessman gave a short interview to Telegram channel Mash, on Saturday, regarding the construction site in the Krasnodar region, which remains the focus of intense rumors both inside the country and in foreign media. Asked if he was acknowledging ownership of the site dubbed ‘Putin’s palace’, Rotenberg said: “This will be a secret no more. I am the beneficiary.”

Imam pravo na to da mi se autokratske vlasti ne sviđaju.

OLIGARCHY IN RUSSIA – ALEXEI NAVALNY’S TELLING MISTAKE

by John Helmer, Moscow

On the subject of oligarchy and the treasure storehouses which oligarchs build for themselves, Alexei Navalny reveals that he’s following a US and NATO script: this takes no account of how President Vladimir Putin rules Russia, or the choice most Russians believe is the preferred alternative to Putin – that’s rule by a combination of officers and civilians acceptable to the military. In the past, the name for that was the Stavka.

Most Russians believe the Army abhors the oligarchs and will eliminate them, along with their corruption, unless Putin can be persuaded to do so himself. For more than twenty years now he has been reluctant; but there is still time. In this effort Navalny’s films are a useful tool – a Russian one, but not one contrived with the assistance and operated for the benefit of Navalny’s foreign supporters.

The details of the Gelendzhik palace in the film Navalny released on January 19 are not new. They have been investigated and widely published by Russian reporters since 2010. In that time they have had no impact on the understanding Russians have of Putin, or his public approval rating.

The Russian evidence is that a group of Russian businessmen conceived of the project as an attempt to curry favour with the president. There is no evidence in Navalny’s film, nor in the Russian reporting which has preceded him, that Putin accepted it. As Sergei Markov commented on Ekho Moskvy radio: “Now Navalny says this again, but does not mention that there is no evidence of Putin’s presence there. Because the impudence of lying has increased many times in ten years…But there is no smoke without fire. What is the reality? this palace[comes from] a group of rich people who are also personally well acquainted with Putin, and [who] decided around 2005 to build a house for him when he resigns from the post of president. But Putin refused to accept such a gift from them”.

This leaves the indisputable fact that the culture of bribery continues to flourish in Russia, and that Putin has failed to deter, diminish, or liquidate it. This isn’t news – all Russians believe it. Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation has been preaching to the converted. The converted, however, will not support Navalny to replace Putin, as Navalny himself and his western supporters insist. To Russian minds, Navalny is a foreign successor for Putin’s oligarchy, not a Russian replacement, nor an end to the system introduced by Boris Yeltsin with US endorsement.

Linguistic analysis of Navalny’s video on the Gelendzhik palace indicates the English subtitles were written first, and then translated for Navalny to speak in Russian. The English is American, not British; and certainly not the English of the German and American operatives who provided the video production technology, editing, and special effects at the Black Forest Studios in Kirchzarten, Germany. According to a German press report from Kirchzarten, “the studio bosses remember that at the beginning of December, a request by email came from a production company in Los Angeles. There was talk of a documentary…In terms of content, the Black Forest Studios have nothing to do with the film, the studio owners emphasize. They only provided the technology and the location and organized the shooting.”

Black Forest Studios in Kirchzarten, located 30 kms north of Navalny’s Black Forest chalet at Ibach. Source: https://www.blackforest-studios.com/ The German intelligence agency BND was in charge of Navalny at Ibach and of his movements in the Black Forest, as well as between Berlin, Ibach, and Dresden (where Navalny visited Putin's 1988-89 apartment). Had the BND wanted, it could have suppressed the German press reports now emerging that it was a US intelligence operation in charge of the film-making at Kirchzarten. In this fashion a part of the German government aims to dissociate itself from Navalny's US operation.

Navalny’s Russian represents a garble of English phrasing, with stylistic mistakes plain to native ears. “He is trying to speak with logic,” according to one Russian linguistic analyst, “but he uses a lot of phrasal constructions of non-colloquial structure common to bureaucracies and corporations.” According to another linguistic analysis by Pavel Danilin, director of the Centre for Political Analysis in Moscow, “let’s recognise that in Russian this combination of words is unwelcome. Unless you are a schoolboy translating the text…Navalny received his text from English-speaking comrades, the original text was in English.”

This is an analysis of vocabulary, syntax, and style of expression. It’s also for adults, not for the young who have learned their Russian from the school textbooks which Putin’s Education Ministry has commissioned from the Rotenberg brothers’ monopoly.

How is it possible for a 44-year old native Russian-speaker with two Moscow university degrees and years of experience in Russian public speaking to make such clumsy mistakes? How is it possible for this figure to fabricate the stories of his poisonings so often that he can’t remember the last fabrication he told, or the contradictions between them he expects his audience to ignore? The answer is that he is a presenter with a script composed by others.

It seemed so when I first interviewed Navalny at his Moscow office in 2008. At the time he had bought a small number of shares in the state oil and gas companies Rosneft, Gazpromneft, Surgutneftegas, and Gazprom, and was taking his minority shareholder rights to local courts to require the companies to open their financial records. One of the objectives was to determine whether there was transfer pricing in the export sales the companies operated with Gennady Timchenko’s Gunvor trading company. Navalny’s office was light, airy, filled with desks and brand-new equipment. But there was no one there except Navalny.

It was plain Navalny was fronting for others. But his campaign for transparency and accountability in Russia’s most important line of business was running in parallel with my reporting. The veracity of the message was what counted, not the character of the messenger, or the calculation of the messenger’s paymaster. It was therefore Navalny’s message I quoted directly.

A decade later in 2018, when Navalny published his evidence of the link between the aluminium oligarch Oleg Deripaska and the Kremlin official Sergei Prikhodko, our effort at investigating the truth was still running in parallel, and I reported accordingly. Navalny’s film drew almost 5 million views; Deripaska’s Instagram reply, 2,685. Prikhodko remains in power as First Deputy Head of the Government (prime ministry); Deripaska too.

U Rusiji stradaš kad napišeš kritiku Putina.

U USA stradaš ako napišeš kritiku BLM, ili kažeš žene su drugačije od muškaraca, ili kažeš imigranti moraju poštovati zakon.

Nemojmo više pričati priče o slobodu govora, i u USA se ljudima zagorča život ili ostanu bez posla već zbog jednog posta na Facebooku ili slično. Hajde nek netko u Holivudu progovori protiv ljevičarskih ideja, može se pozdraviti s karijerom. Sloboda govora na zapadu, autokrate u Rusiji how yes no.

I ta ruska oporba je blesava stvarno, svi do jednog upadnu u tu zamku da se prodaju zapadu.
Nije rus glup, čim oni namirišu da bilo tko razgovara sa Amerikancima ili Englezima diže im se kosa na glavi.

Ruska oporba može doći na vlast samo tako da bude još domoljubnija od Putinovih igrača.