Source:
https://www.hkv.hr/razgovori/42965-dr-s ... vnika.htmlTranslation from Croatian is courtesy of Google...
dr. sc. Mrduljaš: Dodik cannot count on Croatia's support in separating the RS from BiH, joining Serbia and bringing Serbia to the Una and to the hinterland of Dubrovnik
The West has powerful enough instruments to prevent conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but without its presence and willingness to pacify local areas, we would probably witness a series of armed conflicts, perhaps even war conflicts, from Bosnia and Herzegovina through Montenegro and Kosovo to Macedonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina again came into the spotlight after Denis Bećirović, a member of the BiH Presidency, wrote in an author's text to the Euronews portal on Saturday that the situation in BiH is "extremely serious" and the West must react in order to avoid destabilization of the region. We spoke with with Dr. sc. Saša Mrduljaš from the Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences.
Are the quoted words of Denis Bećirović too harsh or is there a serious threat that the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina will boil over and get out of control?
The problem is that the existing structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not result from a mutual agreement between the three peoples, which is not based on equal respect and consideration of their interests. This organization mostly resulted from the conflict between two extremely opposed, extreme platforms: Serbian and Bosniak. One that aspired to the destruction of BiH and the annexation of part of its territory to Serbia, and the other that aspired to the transformation of BiH into a Bosniak national state. The conflict between these two irreconcilable platforms in changed circumstances continued even after Dayton and continues to this day. The fact is that political Sarajevo tends to dismantle and ultimately destroy the Republika Srpska (RS) and bring its vastness basically under Bosniak rule. Equally, it is a fact that the Serbs are still directed towards the separation of the RS and its annexation to Serbia. At the same time, the offensive of political Sarajevo has a stimulating effect on Serbian separatism, with the fact that the Serbs would strive for separation without this offensive. Attempts to impose a state property law on the Serbs, which they perceive as an important step forward in the dismantling of the RS, have now reached a point where the radical polarization and explosiveness of inter-ethnic relations in BiH is becoming clearer. It can be overcome at the moment, but with the existing Serbian and Bosniak politics, we will always reach a point from which, given the right circumstances, it can easily end in armed conflicts, and finally in war conflicts.
The President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik says that Bosniaks are the ones who "want war" and that in that case the RS will not be an "easy target". Does this mean that there could be interference from the side in a possible conflict?
Since the establishment of BiH in 1945, it has been emphasized that it is a republic of its three peoples, i.e. Croats, Serbs and Muslims/Bosniaks. According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1974, they had the status of sovereign and mutually equal nations. Therefore, every organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina was supposed to ensure the status of political entities for these peoples. And that status cannot be disputed with the fact that after the breakup of Yugoslavia, they should have realized it in agreement with the other two nations and with international mediation. They did not do that, but relied on the Serbized JNA and ethnic cleansing "encircled" the part of BiH where the RS was constituted. And that is the problem. As the problem is the attempt to separate that territory and annex it to Serbia.
The problem is that political Sarajevo has never offered a model of the structure of BiH that would respect Croatian and Serbian subjectivity
What would the annexation of that territory to Serbia mean for Croatia?
With such a development, if by any chance possible, Serbia, extremely hostile to Croatia, would break out on the Una and in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, while Bosniaks would border Serbia on three sides. In fact, they would be one big enclave in the state fabric of the Serbian state. And how can Bosniaks and Croats view the establishment and existence of the RS and attempts to annex it to Serbia in any way other than with disdain. So, the RS is a problem, but the problem is that political Sarajevo has never offered a model of the organization of BiH that would respect Serbian and Croatian subjectivity in that country. In particular, if by any chance it is possible to collapse the RS on its soil, a number of cantons should basically be established, some of which would have a Serbian majority, and some of which would have a mixed ethnic structure. Also, on these occasions, the Serbs should elect their own member of the Presidency, their representatives in the House of Peoples, defend their own national interests with a veto. But from the case of the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and the relationship with Croatian positions in that entity, it is noticeable that political Sarajevo does everything to cancel the political subjectivity of the Croatian people by striving to transform FBiH into its own national creation. Therefore, if the termination of the RS was the result of a Bosniak initiative, the Serbs could expect one big nothing. With this in mind, it could be said that political Sarajevo, with its approach, contributes to the convulsive Serbian "grasping" for the RS and Serbian readiness to defend its positions. And it is certain that in the event of a conflict, the Serbs would defend the positions of the RS. The question is with what success. But I doubt that it will happen, given that the West has powerful enough instruments to prevent conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But without his presence and willingness to pacify the local areas, we would probably witness a series of armed conflicts, perhaps even war conflicts, from BiH through Montenegro and Kosovo to Macedonia.
At the same time, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs claims that he relies on the support of Serbia, Hungary, Russia, China and Azerbaijan in the implementation of his policy, but also counts on relations with Croatia. In what sense with Croatia?
Dodik cannot count on the support of Croatia in the context of the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the separation of the RS from Bosnia and Herzegovina, its annexation to Serbia and the bringing of an essentially anti-Croatian Serbia to the Una and to the hinterland of Dubrovnik. Croatia and the Croats in BiH are for BiH as it should have been since its founding, i.e. for BiH in which each of the three nations retains its subjectivity and in which the content of BiH statehood is determined by agreement. So, if the Croats want to regenerate and preserve their political subjectivity in BiH, it is clear that they cannot deny it to the Serbs at the same time. From the Croatian perspective, as has been said, there is no enthusiasm for the existence of RS and the way in which its size and distribution of territory were determined. But there is no enthusiasm for the idea of demolishing RS so that 49 percent of "its" territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina would basically be subjugated to Bosniaks, and that in a country where Croats are denied not only their political identity but also their national identity. Namely, anyone who has an insight into the prevailing Bosniak perceptions of BiH Croats knows that they are seen as some kind of Bosniak Catholics who only "became" Croats through propaganda from Croatia, which, if opportunities allow, should be changed. Well, if it doesn't go any other way, then by waiting for the Croatian "outflow" from Bosnia and Herzegovina and reducing the Croats to an imperceptible numerical minority.
Croatia has the longest land border with BiH. A favorable security situation in the neighborhood is therefore important to Croatia. What is the easiest way to achieve this?
With these two radical political platforms, i.e. Serbian and Bosniak, Croatia will permanently have an electrified and potentially explosive political reality in its neighborhood. But whatever the state of BiH is, its statehood and integrity are a guarantee for Croatia that it will not have a much bigger problem in its neighborhood, i.e. little-big Serbia. On the other hand, the existence of the RS, whatever it is, is one of the guarantees that BiH will not be transformed into a Bosniak, realistically Muslim-majority state, the establishment of which could also bring unexpected problems to Croatia. Especially when you take into account the Bosniaks' immersion in the role of the heirs of medieval Bosnia and their enthusiasm for its inroads into the Adriatic. For Croatia and the Croats of BiH, the optimal solution would be a sovereign and indivisible BiH in which, I repeat, all three peoples would preserve their subjectivity through the complex structure of that country. One that includes majority Croat, Serb, Bosniak cantons, or conditionally speaking national units, then mixed cantons where the composition of the population is heterogeneous, municipalities with a majority of individual people where possible, the right to elect their own national representatives, determination of the content of Bosnian-Herzegovinian statehood by consensus representatives of the three nations, the right to protect vital national interests by veto, etc.
Bosniak media accuse not only Serbia, but also Croatia of interfering in BiH's internal affairs. Why are they so bothered by national equality in state institutions, which Croatian politics insists on?
It bothers them because they want BiH as their own national state. Advocating for a civil definition of sovereignty in B&H while simultaneously anticipating Bosniak absolute numerical supremacy, political Sarajevo wants to "cover" first the Croats in the FBiH, and then the Serbs at the level of B&H. They see such BiH as the best guarantee for the positions of the Bosniak people. And there is no need to be fooled. The politically prevailing Bosniak policy views Croats and Serbs equally in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, it leaves them with an extremely narrow framework for survival as Croats and Serbs. From the Bosniak perspective, specifically in the Croatian case, the problem is not just the former existence of Herceg-Bosnia, but the problem, as further development has shown, is the very election of a Croat member of the BiH presidency, the existence of the House of Peoples, veto rights in it, the problem is the cantons etc. However, on one level, there is a difference in the relation between Serb-Bosniak and Croat-Bosniak relations. Namely, not only recent events have accumulated deep, insurmountable animosities in the sphere of Serb-Bosniak relations. This is not the case in the sphere of Croat-Bosniak relations. Despite all the problematic parts of those relations, there is still a sufficient amount of appreciation at that level, which would be good to use for a more meaningful definition of the political dimension of Croat-Bosniak relations. Such that the Bosniaks would understand that the Croats are for BiH, that they do not want to threaten its integrity and indivisibility with the complex organization they stand for, that the Croats understand the positions of the Bosniaks, but that they cannot stop being Croats or leave the definition, protection and further shaping to others. your identity.
In your opinion, what are the current biggest threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina?
As long as the RS exists, there will be an aspiration for its separation from Bosnia and Herzegovina and its annexation to Serbia. In this sense, there must be a harmonized Croat-Bosniak point of view, and thus the unified potential of Croatia with the potential of Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This cannot happen as long as the Bosniaks are working on the transformation of the FBiH into their own national entity and as long as they strive to reduce the RS to their own national space. They must offer a solution that sufficiently protects their positions, but which at the same time respects the political subjectivity of the Croatian and Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Specifically, what does political Sarajevo aim for?
Politically, Sarajevo aspires to turn the FBiH into a Bosniak national entity and thereby acquire an appropriate geopolitical basis for dealing with the RS, for its demolition and takeover of the entire BiH. So he wants everything. As Carl Bildt described well in his book, he wants 100 percent power over 100 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And in this sense, the Croats in the FBiH are perceived as a hindrance, and not as a partner people in the construction of that entity and BiH itself. However, the decisive factor in all of this is the international community, i.e. the West, which for its own reasons has allowed the development of relations in FBiH to date. What did it all bring together? Well, the marked political distance between Croats and Bosniaks in the FBiH confirmed the Serbs' belief that they cannot hope for anything good from political Sarajevo. How useful such a policy is for Bosniaks themselves is a separate question.
This kind of attitude towards the Croats puts them in a position to remain alone towards the Serbs. Perhaps in the current circumstances marked by the international presence, this does not seem particularly delicate, but it is still a question of the relationship between 1.5 million Bosniaks and 6.5 million Serbs.
The celebration of the Day of the Republic of Srpska has been announced. Is it another cause for conflict?
I don't think that January 9 and the announcement of the independence of the RS are decisive because it can be overcome by some ad hoc solutions. However, this situation will repeat itself as long as we have two maximalist platforms confronting each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. Serbian and Bosniak. In any case, threats to declare the independence of the RS and its separation from Bosnia and Herzegovina and its annexation to Serbia represent a direct stimulus to the destabilization of the entire region. In the event of the declaration of independence of the RS, now or sometime in the future, it would be meaningful for the highest state bodies of BiH to automatically declare the dissolution of the RS and the integration of its territoriality into the framework of the FBiH. With the fact that on the former territory of the RS, the establishment of three majority Serbian cantons (Banjol, Bijelji, Trebinje) and two ethnically mixed ones (Dervent-Posavina and Podrinje) should be declared at the same time. With the fact that the status of Serbs as a political subject in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be questioned under any circumstances, that is, the status that Croats and Bosniaks should have.
How do you evaluate the role of the high international representative for BiH, Christian Schmidt, who is often criticized by the Serbian, but lately also by the Bosniak side in BiH?
High representatives, i.e. the international community itself or, realistically, the West, have been helping political Sarajevo for a long time by redefining relations in the FBiH in favor of the Bosniaks. Thus, from the Bosniak perspective, a belief was created that this must be the case and that such a policy must continue. Basically, the policy of collapsing the Croatian positions in the FBiH, and to some extent the Serbian positions in the RS. As soon as that process is somewhat stopped and redirected, there is deep dissatisfaction within the Bosniak milieu, basically with the West itself, and the formation of animosity towards it. Even now, it will be difficult for the politics of that same West to correct the "curves of the Drina" that it itself created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In such a way that in that country, for years, he has been collapsing the positions of the only safe support for his own civilizational and value system within Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the positions of the Croatian people in that country.
Is the solution to overcome the tension in Bosnia and Herzegovina to open the negotiation process on the accession of that country to the European Union as soon as possible?
Certainly, it would be desirable for the citizens and peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to open the negotiation process on accession to the EU as soon as possible, and ultimately to enter it. With the fact that the crucial inter-national disagreements in that country cannot be resolved by negotiating the EU or by joining the EU. And that can be seen, for example. from the case of Northern Ireland, Catalonia, the Scottish referendum, etc. Croatia should certainly support that process, but with the condition of regeneration and preservation of the political subjectivity of the Croatian people in the FBiH, i.e. BiH.
Thank you for the conversation!
