PRAVOPISNI SUKOBI
U Hrvatskoj 12 % ispitanika vjeruje da Hrvati i Srbi govore isti jezik, a šokirat će vas postotak u Srbiji

U Srbiji 46 posto ispitanika smatra da je dubrovačka književnost i hrvatska i srpska

Hrvatski i srpski su jedan jezik koji Hrvati zovu hrvatskim, a Srbi srpskim, rekao je jednom prilikom Miroslav Krleža. No, većina Hrvata danas se ne slaže s tim stavom velikog književnika.

Čak 88 posto govornika hrvatskog u Hrvatskoj smatra da je njihov jezik različit od srpskog, a samo 12 posto ispitanika misli da su hrvatski i srpski isti jezik, pokazala je studija "Understanding spelling conflicts in Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian: Insights from speakers‘ attitudes and beliefs", nedavno objavljena u uglednom časopisu Lingua izdavača Elsevier.

Croatian speakers are the only language group who overwhelmingly (87.7%) believe that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs speak different languages today.




I asked whether speakers believe that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs spoke the same language in Socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1990) (Q14, Fig. 13) and whether they believe they do so now (Q15; Fig. 14).

Only among speakers of Croatian did the majority believe that speakers of the language group spoke different languages in Yugoslavia (87.2%, strong effect size 0.62), and likewise that they speak different languages today (87.7%, strong effect size 0.68).

The great majority of Serbian speakers in Montenegro (strong effect size 0.80), BiH (strong effect size 0.79), and Serbia (strong effect size 0.54) believe language groups shared the same language in Yugoslavia with an average of 87.2%.

Three language groups hold the attitude of the language also being the same today with an average of 81.4% – speakers of Serbian in Montenegro (strong effect size 0.53), BiH (moderate effect size 0.43), and Serbia (moderate effect size 0.42).

A narrow majority of Montenegrin speakers also believed that speakers spoke the same language in Yugoslavia (56.8%) and today (52.3%), although the result is not statistically significant.

An average of 75% of Croatian speakers preferred the three old (“traditional”) spelling variants, which are identical to the forms used in Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Serbian today, whereas 73.2% of Montenegrin speakers accepted the new Montenegrin letters in practice.

For speakers who consider their language different, one may ask why Croats do not support the new spelling variants that would make their language more visually distinct from Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Serbian.

My interpretation is grounded in the notion of the endangerment of national language ideology.

Croatia ultimately achieved its political objectives (the reintegration of territory, recognition of the country’s sovereignty, political acceptance of the Croatian language, etc.), so Croatian speakers no longer felt any threat of further linguistic or political unification with Serbian.

The Serbian population in Croatia is only 4.4% and the proportion of Serbian speakers is 1.2%, which means that more than two-thirds (71.8%) of all Serbs did not declare the name of their language to be Serbian (Census, 2011).

This survey reveals that 73.4% of those who identified themselves as Serbs stated Croatian as their language. (The remaining 26.6% of Serbs declared Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian as their language, while none stated Serbian).

Yet almost half (47.5%) of the 500 participants from Montenegro identified their language as Serbian (similar to the 42.9% in the 2011 census data), and 95.6% of these Serbian speakers considered Montenegrin to be a variety of Serbian. (In the survey, 18.2% of respondents who identified nationally as Montenegrins declared their language as Serbian.)

Thus, Montenegrin language identity is far more threatened by Serbian than Croatian is in Croatia, and so Montenegrin spelling has a substantially greater potential for national symbolism.

Indeed, the question about the new Montenegrin letters is one that shows the strongest polarization: compared with support among Montenegrin speakers at 73.2%, 95.1% of Serbian speakers in Montenegro were against the use of the letters.

A comparison between speakers of Serbian in BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia on the three questions about the “one or more languages” issue (Q13–15: South Slavonic language classification, the language in Yugoslavia and today; Fig. 16) shows that

the belief in one language is consistently widespread among Serbian speakers in BiH (93.7% for Yugoslavia, 80.5% for today) and in Montenegro (90.2% for Yugoslavia, 89.6% for today), compared with in Serbia itself (77.9% for Yugoslavia, 74.2% for today).

I interpret these results as reflecting perceptions of the national language ideology as being endangered (for Serbian official language policy, this entails the view that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs speak the same language).

The more the question of one language is challenged in a country, the stronger the Serbian respondents’ belief in one language.

Montenegrin is overwhelmingly considered a variety of Serbian, but nevertheless Montenegrin has been standardized and Montenegrins have developed a strong national identity based on it.

Thus, the standardization of Montenegrin is a direct attack on the one-language view advocated by Serbia’s official language policy.

Furthermore, Serbian and Bosnian speakers are the two most dominant language groups in the same country (BiH), and there have been serious disagreements over national language ideology.

We turn now to the effects of endangered national language ideology and their impacts on spelling conflicts.

Respondents’ views on whether speakers of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian were speaking the same language in Yugoslavia (1945–1990) and whether they do so today are revealing.

Croatian speakers think differently from the rest (with strong effect sizes for both questions): more than four-fifths (87.2%) of Croats believe that Croatian both was and still is a different language.

I interpret this difference as reflecting a strong perception that Croats’ national symbols (for example, national history, literature heritage, spelling norms, the name of the language, language ideology, language history) are different from those of other language groups.

For instance, among respondents from Croatia who identified themselves as Croats, 98.9% (N = 446) named Croatian as their language, which confirms that a national language identity is undisputed by Croats.

Moreover, Croats considered old Dubrovnik literature as exclusively a part of the Croatian written heritage, unlike Serbs, whose National Assembly in 2021 adopted the Cultural Heritage Act, which proclaimed that old Dubrovnik literature is both Serbian and Croatian (ZKN, 2021).

Serbian speakers from all three countries largely believe that Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian are one language (the average from all three countries is 87.2% for the Yugoslav period and 81.4% for today), because of their perception of common heritage and origin.

Among respondents from Serbia with a national identification as Serbs, 95.8% (N = 450) called their language Serbian.

As in Croatia, this evidence of a strong (Serbian) language identity is in line with the strong support for their (Serbian) views on one or more languages.

But the responses from Bosnian and Montenegrin speakers differed from those of Croatian and Serbian speakers.

The proportion of Montenegrins who believe that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs speak the same language is markedly lower (56.8% for Yugoslavia, 52.3% for today).

Among participants from Montenegro who identified as Montenegrins (N = 230), 74% called their language Montenegrin, which is notably less, compared with what Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs call their own language.

Bosnian speakers strongly believe that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs speak the same language (75.5% for the Yugoslav period, 68.3% for today), but respondents from BiH who nationally identified themselves as Bosniaks (N = 206) did not even all agree about the name of their language: while 86% named it Bosnian, 9.7% call it Bosniak, although both language names refer to the same language.

These Montenegrin and Bosnian results indicate that their national language identity is still forming (especially Montenegrin), compared with the Croatian and Serbian respondents.

Interestingly, the above contrast between Croatian and Serbian on the one hand, and Bosnian and Montenegrin on the other, was also present in the difference in how strongly the spelling topics were associated within these language groups.

Table 17 shows that spelling-related questions are among the top three in BiH and Montenegro.

This is not the case in Croatia and Serbia, and it indicates that Bosnian and Montenegrin respondents correlate spelling issues more often with the sociopolitical context.

Second, the perception of whether Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs speak the same language depends, in turn, on the sociopolitical context.

Respondents believe less in the same language today than during the Yugoslav period (1945–1991).

I have established a link between spelling conflicts and the perception of one language, and I hypothesize that if the perception of different languages continues to increase over time, spelling conflicts are going to decrease.

Third, the perception of speaking the same language is contingent on whether a speaker’s belief about one or more languages is being threatened by other language groups.

Serbian respondents in Serbia believe less in the same language than do Serbian speakers in Montenegro and BiH, where their beliefs are being challenged by Bosnian and Montenegrin national language ideologies.

This means that tensions, conflicts, and threats among language groups increase the cohesion of national language ideology within the language group.

In this context, stronger spelling-change conflicts indicate a stronger cohesion within contesting groups.

Sebba (2007: 155) concluded that successful reforms of orthographies are rare and that “conservativism is almost always the most attractive option for the majority of language users,” which illustrates the relevance of the second principle in the understanding of spelling-change conflicts.

An example here could be various conservative arguments, such as the older culture argument, the homograph argument, and the etymological argument, elaborated by Geerts et al. (1977) for the Dutch spelling reforms.

This research was funded by the European Commission under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions framework in 2019. (Grant agreement ID 892979) with total funds of €224,933.76.

Fig. 12 shows that language groups think very differently about whether Serbian is also a hypernym for Bosnian, Croatian, and Montenegrin.

As one might expect, the speakers of Croatian (92.4%, strong effect size 0.82), Bosnian (80.7%, strong effect size 0.62), and Montenegrin (80.5%, strong effect size 0.62) disagree, unlike the speakers of Serbian in BiH (65.6%, weak effect size 0.29), who agree that Serbian is a hypernym (Table 11).

Indeed, Serbian speakers in Montenegro also support the idea of a Serbian hypernym (55.4%) but the result is not statistically significant.

The sign test results from Serbia are surprising: there are more speakers of Serbian who disagree (50.3%) than agree (49.6%) with the school textbook definition of the South Slavonic language classification, which presents Serbian as the hypernym for all these groups.

Gluposti. To je sve jedan jezik.
Jedino pitanje je kako se taj jezik zove?
Najstariji dokument koji taj naš jezik precizno nekako naziva je Istarski Razvod iz 12 stoljeća koji se nalazi u muzeju u Rijeci i naziva ga "hrvacki"

"...bihu pisani na let Božjih 1195, ke listi ondi pred nas trih nodari postaviše, keh ta gospoda izibra: jednoga latinskoga, a drugoga nimškoga, a tretoga hrvackoga, da imamo vsaki na svoj orijinal pisat, poimeno od mesta do mesta..."

"...i jednoj i drugoj strani pisaše listi jazikom latinskim i hrvackim, a gospoda sebe shraniše jazikom nemškim... "

Dakle cirkus i jedni i drugi.
Hrvatine se guraju da su to dva različita jezika
Jugoslavenčine se guraju da je to jedan jezik a ne nazivaju ga pravim hrvatskim imenom

Klauni jedni i drugi

Ako ima preko 70% sličnosti onda je to jedan jezik .

U Hrvatskoj 88% Hrvatina. Nije ni to loše.

Uglavnom ovo šta je danas standard je samo rezultat propalog jugoslavenskog eksperimenta. Zato triba jačat naše dijalektalizme.

Ne trebamo. Novoštokavski je HRVATSKI. Ijekavica je HRVATSKA. Tako su govorili i pisali naši pisci koji su taj jezik nazivali hrvatskim, a Hrvatima su ih nazivali i stranci.

Ne trebamo se odricati ničega jer je to naše.

Pravoslavci (koji nisu imali srpsku svijest do 19. stoljeća, a nemaju ni srpsko porijeklo, niti govore srpski jezik) u Lici nose iste ličke kape kao i Hrvati. I sad bismo se mi po tvojoj logici trebali odreći tih kapa. Odreći se nečega što je samo, jedino i ISKLJUČIVO HRVATSKO, zato što su si to novokomponirani Srbi prisvojili.

Neće moći

Različiti jezici naravno, koji su se nastojali približiti tijekom Jugoslavije.

Danas kada se razvijaju razdvojeno jedan od drugog, ti jezici će opet biti sve više različiti.

To što imaju nekih sličnosti je normalno. Slični su i češki i slovački, ili španjolski i portugalski, ili norveški, danski i švedski. Svi nabrojani se međusobno razumiju bez prevoditelja.

88% Hrvata bilingualno. Impresivno, je li to svjetski rekord?

Mujo glup ko ***, to nije impresivno nego standardno.

Slični su jer se radilo na zajedničkom jeziku, znači to je produkt namjere, nisu do tad bili slični van neke općenite slavenske sličnosti.

Drago mi je da je većina u RH samosvjesna na tom polju.