TE na ugalj , pogotovo s novim tehnologijama koje su "nature friendly" su dobro rješenje , međutim Europa je potpuno pošandrcala , da ne drvim previše pošto ću samo copy paste dva dobra komentara sa članka:





Tu sve piše , u samo dva komentara , energetiku u Europi uređuju ljudi koji misle da struja dolazi iz utičnica. Znam zvuči pojednostavljeno , ali nekad je istina jednostavna ma kako glupa bila. I sviđa mi se kako je lik očitao frau Merkel ,uvjerljivo naveći politički patuljak na čelu Njemačke od 2.sv.rata

Informacije koje dolaze su često kontradiktorne, nedavno sam naišao na tekst o njemačkim planovima i aktivnostima da značajno povećaju udjel energije iz lignita, drugi izovori govore da Njemčka napušta nuklearnu energiju i investira u obnovljivu, jesli li upoznat što se događa?
Kako god bilo ne vjerujem da njemaćka energetska strategija ovisi o hiru AM, a ne vjerujem ni da je Njemačka glupa pa da se oslanja na nadanja o tehnološkom napretku i da se olako odriče svoje enrgetske sigurnosti.

Zeleni lobi u Njemačkoj je izuzetno jak i nametnuo se populističkim metodama njemačkoj javnosti , ti pametnjakovići su prisilili državu da zatvara NE, zatvara TE te dijeli okolo poticaje za obnovljive izvore, kao što vidiš ni Njemačka nije izuzeta od ljudske gluposti. To se dogodi kad stručnjake zamijene političari i neznalice a šteta se mjeri u milijardama.

Betray Your Bank Before Your Bank Betrays You

By Jonathan Weil Mar 28, 2013 6:00 PM ET

What’s a Slovenian with several hundred thousand euros in the bank supposed to do? Spread it out among at least a few different banks, that’s what. Or move the money out of the country, while it’s still possible.

Imagine what must be on the minds of any savvy depositors still left at Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d., now 79 percent- owned by Slovenia’s government. It was one of only four lenders in October that failed the European Banking Authority’s latest capital-adequacy test, a ritual best known for how lax its standards are. One that flunked was Bank of Cyprus Pcl, where uninsured depositors face 40 percent losses as part of the country’s bailout terms. Another was Cyprus Popular Bank Pcl, also known as Laiki Bank, where uninsured deposits will fare far worse and the bank is being shut.

Cypriot banks’ customers were complacent after uninsured deposits went unscathed in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, the first euro-area countries to seek international rescues. Slovenians won’t have that excuse should their country be next.
The former Yugoslav republic needs about 3 billion euros ($3.8 billion) of funding this year, while its struggling banks need 1 billion euros of fresh capital, the International Monetary Fund said last week. Slovenia’s central bank this week urged the country’s new government to quickly carry out a plan to recapitalize ailing lenders. It’s a familiar pattern.

Oblivious Customers

The Central Bank of Cyprus warned months ago that the country’s banks needed an infusion of 10 billion euros -- which is more than half the size of the nation’s economy -- largely because of heavy losses on Greek sovereign debt held by Laiki and Bank of Cyprus. It seems a lot of customers were oblivious to the banks’ deteriorating health, or were confident they would be cared for by somebody else. The country is getting a 10 billion-euro bailout, nine months after it first asked for aid, except none of the money will go to the banks.

Suddenly it should be dawning on a lot of Europeans that deposit-guarantee limits matter. In Slovenia, the maximum is 100,000 euros per depositor, the same as in Cyprus. (Deposit- insurance programs vary among the 17 countries that use the euro.) For a few days last week, it looked as if customers at Laiki and Bank of Cyprus would lose even some of their insured deposits, which would have been a sacrilege.

That plan was scrapped, but could resurface elsewhere for all we know should some genius at the German Finance Ministry insist upon it. The one constant among bailouts of euro-area countries is that there is no rhyme or reason, much less fairness, in the way many details get worked out.

Cypriots may bemoan the inequities of their rough treatment, as might a bunch of wealthy Russians who mistook the island for a reliable financial center and failed to yank their money when they could. For the rest of Europe, the implications should be obvious. Anyone who leaves uninsured deposits in a euro-area bank is on notice that their money can and will be taken from them, if that is what’s demanded by the troika of the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
Uninsured deposits aren’t riskless. Nor should they be. Still, it’s unclear why the euro area’s central planners sought to create a precedent that encourages capital flight from weak countries. This could lead to more instability, not less.

So far, there have been no signs of a mass exodus in countries such as Italy or Spain. But deposit migrations can happen slowly, with lots of time passing before they appear in official statistics. Or maybe little will change and most bank customers will go on believing “it can’t happen here,” until one day it does.

Restoring Normalcy

Much good might come from restoring some semblance of normalcy to the hierarchy of creditors in banking. Even better would be to see Germany try it for a change with its own zombie lenders, such as Commerzbank AG (CBK), which is still partly government-owned after its bailout in 2009.

The way it’s supposed to work at failing banks is that shareholders get wiped out first. Next the losses go up the ladder from junior debt holders to senior bondholders, and then all the way to uninsured depositors, if need be. Taxpayers and insured depositors shouldn’t have to absorb others’ losses or put money at risk to spare them. Troubled banks should have to fend for themselves.

This was the approach imposed on Cyprus. In ordinary circumstances, it would be considered fair. The best argument for why it wasn’t is that Cyprus had been lulled into believing it would be treated just as well as Europe’s other bailout recipients. The entire country got hooked on moral hazard.

Now Cyprus may be the template for the future, regardless of European governments’ recent statements to the contrary. If a bankrupt euro-area country can’t afford to recapitalize its own insolvent banks, it will have to “bail in” their owners and creditors first as a condition of receiving outside aid. Or at least that’s what Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem said this week in an outburst of candor, before later retracting the statement after it triggered declines in European markets.

Wealthy depositors in Spain, Italy, Greece and elsewhere should assume he was speaking the truth the first time and take measures to protect their money, rather than trusting governments to do it for them.

(Jonathan Weil is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

25 Lessons From The Cyprus 'Deal'

Via Paul Mortimer-Lee, BNP Paribas

Lesson 1: Do not underestimate the ability of the eurozone to do the right thing – after all the alternatives are exhausted;

Lesson 2: Eleventh hour deals can often lead to mistakes and have unintended consequences. The decision to haircut depositors under EUR 100k was a pothole the Troika fell into. It questioned the integrity of the EUR 100k deposit guarantee;

Lesson 3: The disappearance of Mario Monti from the scene has reduced the influence the South has on decisions about the future of the euro;

Lesson 4: There appears to be bailout fatigue in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. Mrs Merkel is prepared to be tougher ahead of the election than many thought;

Lesson 5: The new Chair of the Eurogroup, Mr Dijsselbloem, seems to be a hardliner compared with his predecessor, Mr Junker from Luxembourg;

Lesson 6: Mr Dijsselbloem can sometimes be too outspoken and not sufficiently diplomatic. Beware future gaffes;

Lesson 7: The ECB is prepared to use the ultimate weapon – “no more money for your banks”. This is not exactly ejecting a country from the eurozone, but would amount to making it very difficult for it to stay in;

Lesson 8: Such a threat has profound political implications and is above even Draghi’s pay grade, so must have the backing of Mrs Merkel and others;

Lesson 9: When a problem is not seen to be systemic, there will be reluctance in Germany and like-minded countries to use taxpayers’ money to solve it. Cost/benefit balancing will ensure each case really is “unique”;

Lesson 10: This puts private interests at greater risk in absorbing the financial pain, or at least the first tranche of it, especially in small non-systemic countries;

Lesson 11: “They” (the Troika) will seek to use private money where they can to limit the size of public sector involvement. While each case is unique, the principles are the same. In Greece, government bondholders took the pain; in Cyprus large depositors. Each case is “unique” but there may well be further “unique cases”, each different in its own special way;

Lesson 12: When it comes to resolving banks’ difficulties there is a hierarchy of who will take the pain: shareholders first, then junior bondholders, then senior bondholders, then large depositors, then the state, then foreign taxpayers;

Lesson 13: How much pain the private sector will take depends on whether or not a problem is seen as “systemic” or not. The less systemic it is, the more private interests will suffer;

Lesson 14: Some countries see firewalls as adequate. So they are now prepared to “burn” stakeholders who were previously protected;

Lesson 15: The probability of direct bank recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has gone down;

Lesson 16: Moral hazard has been reduced;

Lesson 17: We crossed a Rubicon of sorts when capital controls were introduced in Cyprus. A Cypriot bank euro is not freely exchangeable with German bank euro. The euro area became more fragmented;

Lesson 18: It may be more difficult to remove capital controls than expected;

Lesson 19: A precedent for the use of capital controls has been set that can speed up capital flight in a crisis, raising the probability of their subsequent re-use;

Lesson 20: It would be surprising if larger depositors were not making defensive moves out of weak banks and banking systems. Watch the scale of ECB MROs and ELA operations;

Lesson 21: The Cypriot economy will see a major recession;

Lesson 22: The Cypriot programme will, consequently, prove to be too optimistic, there will have to be another;

Lesson 23: While Draghi has bought time, the fundamental problems in the eurozone are a long way from being solved, and can come back to haunt markets;

Lesson 24: Do not expect Russia to take the loss with a feeble protest – there will be consequences;

Lesson 25: Conditionality is very important to the core countries. There is no such thing as a conditions-free bailout. There are no blank cheques and no free access to Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) or ESM. There is no such thing as a free lunch (unless not having a free lunch threatens the system).

It appears, given news from Italy today, that European depositors are increasingly coming to the realization that deposits in their local bank are not 'safe' places to put their spare cash, but are in fact loans to extremely leveraged businesses. In a somewhat wishy-washy, 'hide-the-truth'-like statement on Monte dei Paschi's website, the CEO admits to, "the withdrawal of several billion in deposits." Of course, the reasons why these depositors withdrew their capital from the oldest bank in the world will never be known though of course he blames it on "reputational damage" from their derivative cheating scandal. Unsurprisingly, as Reuters notes, the CEO declined to give a forecast on the level of deposits at the end of the first quarter of 2013; no wonder given the bank just doubled its expectations for bad loans and the 'Cypriot Solution' dangling over uninsured depositor hordes.

BMPS Capital Structure...





Via Reuters,

Customers' deposits at Italian bank Monte dei Paschi fell by "a few billion euros" ... the bank said in a document posted on its web site on Saturday.

...

But it has yet to make clear what impact the scandal itself had on its first quarter results.

"The illicit nature of the derivatives trades and their consequence on the bank's assets exposed the bank to reputational damage that was immediately translated into...the withdrawal of a few billion euros in deposits," the bank said in a document for shareholders attending its April 29 meeting.

...

But he declined to give a forecast on the level of deposits at the end of the first quarter of 2013 or to indicate the outlook for net interest income and loan loss provisions.

provlači se taj izraz "troika" kroz nekoliko članaka i pitam se što to pretstavlja, kad tamo MMF, EU komisija i ECB. otkud im taj izraz troika, očito je slavenski?!

Radi se o depozitima pojedinacno vecima od 100 000 eura,dakle sigurno ne o "obicnim" ljudima. EU ne dopusta vise porezne oaze i to je posve u redu s obzirom da su odredjene drzave na taj nacin zaradjivale masne pare pruzajuci gradjanima drugih zemalja EU sigurnost od oporezivanja u vlastitoj im domovini.

Radi se o depozitima pojedinacno vecima od 100 000 eura,dakle sigurno ne o "obicnim" ljudima. EU ne dopusta vise porezne oaze i to je posve u redu s obzirom da su odredjene drzave na taj nacin zaradjivale masne pare pruzajuci gradjanima drugih zemalja EU sigurnost od oporezivanja u vlastitoj im domovini.

Dopušta kolega, dopušta. Obratite pažnju na linkove koje sam stavljao na temi ovih dana.

Austria attacks UK, as EU finance talks get ugly

Austria has said the UK is a haven for money launderers ahead of an EU meeting in Dublin, with Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia's (potential) bailout needs also on the agenda.

Djelomični bankrot (default), restruktuiranje koje je napravljeno tijekom pregovora sa investitorima koji su bili vlasnici tih državnih obveznica. Nije otimanje nego loša investicija, i ništa novo jer je Grčka u zadnjih nekoliko stoljeća bankrotirala koliko god hoćeš puta. Ovo restruktuiranje je ipak blaža varijanta od totalnog bankrota, kojeg je danas ipak teže izvesti u državama koje su članice raznih asocijacija (EU, EMU).

Kao investitor u obveznice nemaš hipoteku nad prirodnim i infrastrukturnim resursima zemlje, obveznica nije isto kao kredit koji je osiguran kolateralom (hipotekom) kojeg ti banka može oduzeti.

Puno je lakše u banana državama, npr. kao u Argentini.

Evo grčkih detalja, a ispod i podsjetnika o Argentini, koji je isto noviji slučaj:



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina_default

Kao investitor u obveznice nemaš hipoteku nad prirodnim i infrastrukturnim resursima zemlje, obveznica nije isto kao kredit koji je osiguran kolateralom (hipotekom) kojeg ti banka može oduzeti.

Znači infrastruktura i prirodni resursi ne idu na bubanj ni u kojim uvjetima, koji su onda kriteriji i do koje mjere država mora garanirati povrat dugova kupcima državnih obveznica, a u kojem momentu država pravno može reći da su investitori napravili lošu investiciju i da im slijedi pušiona?

Ne idu, jer državne obveznice ne predstavljaju hipoteku nad infrastrukturom i resursima te zemlje. Kupovina državne obveznice predstavlja tvoje kreditiranje države bez kolaterala, a jedina sigurnost ti je činjenica da država (za razliku od privatnih subjekata) ima instrument zakona/prisile pri ostvarivanju vlastitih prihoda (kroz poreze), koje može iskoristiti da bi isplatila svoje dugove (glavnicu i kamatu obveznice), kao i vlastitu monetarku politiku (za zemlje koje nisu članice monetarne unije).

Što se tiče struktura državnih obveznica, ima i tu određenih inovacija kako bi se investitori kompenzirali za rizik koji sve više podsjeća na rizik u dionicama. Pojedine zemlje razmatraju emisiju obveznica koje isplaćuju kamatu vezanu za rast BDP-a te zemlje.

Ako želiš obveznice koje imaju jednu vrstu hipoteke nad resursima zemlje, onda ljudima preporučam da kupe obveznice koja izdaju državne elektroprivrede ili telekomi, jer u slučaju "pušione" vlasnici zih obveznica postaju vlasnici kompanije i njenih sredstava.

Pretpostavljam da se misli na nominalni rast?

Pojedine zemlje razmatraju emisiju obveznica koje isplaćuju kamatu vezanu za rast BDP-a te zemlje.

Opet nisi odgovorio, u kojim uvjetima država pravno ili po ekonomskim pravilima možđe reći da ne može servisirati kamate, jer ako može Grčka zašto ne može i HR tako ili bilo koja druga država, sigurno postoje neki definirani uvjeti.