Kad vam Bosna bude babovina onda će te moći davati takove ultimatume.

Dakle, drzava sjediste Europske unije.

Je li moguce europeizirati Muslimane u BiH, koji politicke uzore vide na drugim kontinentima, istocno i juzno od Europe?

Tako bi i svi konstitutivni narodi trebali u manjem entitetu birati jednak broj ministara.

All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers. There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters.

Crisis Group recommends a novel solution, to fuse all elements into one executive body: a government that would also, collectively, be the head of state. This government, the Council of Ministers, should be directly elected and have a mandatory coalition.

Parties would put forward candidates on nation-wide party lists. The lists would be “open”, allowing voters on election day to select their preferred candidate within a list. Seats in the Council of Ministers would be allocated to each party proportionally based on the share of total votes the candidates on its lists won. The parties with the most votes from each of the three political communities would nominate the three co-chairs of the Council, who would be the candidates with the most votes from each of those three parties. Each co-chair would also choose a ministry to head. There would be no seats without portfolio.

The remaining seats would be distributed proportionally between the parties in the same way that seats in the House of Representatives are now. After all were allocated in the Council, the process would continue in the House. In sum: the top candidate from the top party of each of the three political communities would be a co-chair (making three co-chairs); and the remainder of cabinet seats would be divided proportionally between all winning parties, with parties again awarding seats to those candidates with the most votes on their lists. Parties would also win legislative seats according to their total vote share and would nominate for those seats the candidates with the most votes who had not already taken cabinet positions.

Had this system been in place in 2010, it would have yielded co-chairs from the parties that won the most votes: the Bosnian SDP (Željko Komšić or Denis Bećirević), the Serbian SNSD (Nikola Radmanović or Nikola Špirić) and the Croat HDZ (DraganČović). The rest of the Council seats would have gone to the SDA (two), SDS (Mladen Bosić), SBB (Fahrudin Radončić), SBiH (Haris Silajdžić or Beriz Belkić) and an additional seat each for SDP and SNSD. The system could
be extended to deputy minister posts if desired.

The Council of Ministers would thus comprise the most popular politicians and always at least one minister, a co-chair, chosen by voters of each community. Much of the time, the heads of the winning parties would sit in the Council. Normal business would be settled by majority vote, though given Bosnia’s political culture, there should be a premium on reaching consensus. Sensitive matters, including setting agendas, proposing budgets, concluding international agreements, defence, foreign policy and the like would require consensus at least among the co-chairs. Each co-chair should be able to veto any decision, provided a super-majority of the relevant legislature or caucus sustains that act.

The above Council of Ministers framework would fulfil the central aspirations of each community and empower citizens. The mostly Bosniak Bosnian patriots would likely win a majority of Council seats and often get first pick of ministries; their ministers would have more political weight than now due to the direct election the patriot parties demand.

The Croat community might only be able to win one seat but would be guaranteed a co-chair and so the right to participate in forming consensus positions.

The biggest Serb party would usually have first or second pick and would preserve the consensual decision-making model the RS prizes.

A directly-elected Council would have legitimacy to assume presidential prerogatives of foreign affairs and military command. All sides would benefit from an executive that could take office promptly and be immune to the delays and breakdowns that presently plague the indirect election and coalition-forming processes at state and Federation levels.

For ceremonial purposes, a member of the Council could serve as titular president on a rotating basis, receiving foreign dignitaries and delivering important addresses

Ne konta Šveđanin to, kakav status imaju Hrvati u Zenici takav će Bošnjaci u Mostaru, to je reciprocitet i proporcionalnost.
Ako ćemo gledati koliko je koga, toliko vlasti a ne konstitutivnost Bošnjaci su onda nacionalna manjina u RS, Brčko distruktu i 4 županije u Federaciji.

Ma nemoj ti se slažeš, 50% Bošnjaka ima 6 ministara a 50% Hrvata i Srba 4.

Bošnjačka nvo sranja s kojima možete jedino obrisati dupe.

A to što jedan hrvatski glas vrijedi kao pet bošnjačka?

Hrvatima onoliko vlasti koliko ih ima. Sve proporcionalno i reciprocitetno. Hoçe štovanje u SBK/Usori/Žepçu, nema probmema. Isto Bošnjacima u Stocu, Čapljini i Prozoru.

Kako u Mostaru? Tako i na nivou cijele FBiH i BiH.

Article 43
§ 1. For cases determined by the Constitution, the elected members of each House are divided into a Dutch linguistic group and a French linguistic group, in the manner determined by the law.

§ 2. The senators referred to in Article 67, § 1, 1°, 3° and 6° make up the Dutch linguistic group of the Senate. The senators referred to in Article 67, § 1, 2°, 4° and 7° make up the French linguistic group of the Senate.