Uzbekistan and the Coming Central Asian Storm

By Kamran Bokhari

While the world continues to be captivated by ever-growing crises in the Middle East, the nearby region of Central Asia is headed toward destabilization, as our 2016 forecast suggests. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been ruled by geriatric strongmen for over a quarter of a century, going back to the days of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is at great risk for instability, given that its president has been hospitalized after a reported stroke with no clear succession plan among regional clan rivalries. Since Uzbekistan borders each of the countries in the region, instability there could destabilize in the rest of Central Asia as well.

Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s 78-year-old ruler and the only president the country has had since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been hospitalized, according to reports on Aug. 28. According to official state media outlet UzA, Karimov is receiving in-patient treatment and unnamed medical specialists said that “a full medical examination and subsequent treatment will require a certain period of time.” Uzbekistan is an extremely opaque nation, and thus it is difficult to ascertain the precise status of Karimov’s health. That said, Tashkent has never before released information on the health of the ailing president, which is why it is reasonable to assume that a leadership transition is finally at hand.

Uzbekistan is not your average authoritarian state. Many autocratic regimes, despite the overwhelming influence of the ruling family and friends, develop institutions. In sharp contrast, multiple clans from Uzbekistan’s various regions have long been struggling for power. Karimov was able to rule because he could balance the clans from the country’s three principal regions (Samarkand, Tashkent and Fergana) and four lesser ones (Jizzakh, Kashkadarya, Khorezm and Karakalpak). In addition, Karimov’s family has been at war with itself – as is evident from the publicly acrimonious relationship between his daughters, Gulnara Karimova and Lola Karimova-Tillyaeva.

This means there is no clear line of succession and great risk of a power struggle. The regional bases of the various top clans in the country increases the risk of civil war, though it is possible that the massive costs of infighting could push the elites to negotiate a power-sharing settlement.

However, a negotiated settlement is unlikely because Uzbeks have been ruled with an iron fist for some 140 years, during which there has been zero tolerance for dissent. From 1876 to 1917, Uzbekistan was under the control of czarist Russia. Then the country disappeared behind the iron curtain of the Soviet Union for nearly 75 years. On Sept. 1, Uzbekistan will celebrate the 25th anniversary of its independence.

Many within the fractious ruling elite see Karimov’s death or incapacitation as an opportunity to enhance their power. Such openings are rare, and there are many who do not want to pass up such a historic opportunity. Of course, some have long wanted to maximize their power, but feared the potential anarchy from making a move against Karimov and thus remained aligned with him. Those calculations no longer hold when the incumbent leader is approaching the end of his rule.

All the factions have been preparing for this day and some may have already been engaged in negotiating the new balance of power for this day. No side can truly trust the other and thus suspicions abound about true intentions. In such a situation, the impending transition is not just a historic opportunity, but also a major threat. Thus, each clan has an imperative to make sure that its interests are safeguarded after all is said and done.

Authoritarian regimes do not have established processes to manage power transitions. In Uzbekistan’s case, the situation is even more dire, as it has never experienced a transfer of power. Aggravating this situation is that the usual suspects, i.e., the various factions that form the country’s mainstream, aren’t the only ones eyeing the transition. Since the 1990s, the country has produced the largest jihadist movement in all of Central Asia. It is unclear to what extent insurrectionist Islamists are present in the country to take advantage of the emerging power vacuum. However, Uzbek nationals have been engaged in various jihadist theaters such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and more recently Syria, in the wake of the Islamic State’s rise.

These factions are also hoping to exploit the situation. Their agenda is not confined to the national boundaries. They would love to use Uzbekistan as a springboard to expand into the wider Central Asian region. Uzbeks comprise the largest ethnic community in the Fergana Valley, which is a hotbed of Islamist activity. The region extends into neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, making it a channel to spread instability beyond the country’s borders.

In our 2016 forecast, we predicted that there is no way Central Asian can remain immune from the crises that surround it. Russia is facing a massive financial crunch due to the decline of energy prices. The region’s other major stakeholder, China, is also in crisis because of the global economic downturn. The Middle East is in a state of growing anarchy, which has a natural spillover effect into South Asia.

Indeed, we have seen both civil agitation and armed attacks in the Central Asia’s largest country, Kazakhstan. Not a week goes by without a report about authorities in a Central Asian country either cracking down on radical Islamists or engaging in enhanced security measures. Meanwhile, their economies are not doing well, given the decline of energy prices, which has directly affected Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan is more stable than the other three countries, but are chronically poor.

Uzbekistan, however, holds the key to the future of the region. The country is located at the heart of Central Asia. What happens there will affect the entire region. Therefore, the quickly approaching post-Karimov era is not solely a domestic political problem, but rather one that has potentially massive geopolitical ramifications.

Pocetak radikalizacije jos jedne muslimanske drzave ?

Ovako što sam zaključio po ovoj uzbekistanki što je kod nas na faksu bila preko Erasmusa, oni su relativno normalni muslimani. Islam Karimov se borio protiv Islamista a vidim na njenom FB profilu je stavila crnu zastavu.

Je li čemu? :)

Lijepa ko dolar. Voli rusku književnost i zna recitirati Puškina. Inače je žute rase i rekla je kako joj ide na živce što ljudi u Zgbu uvijek pretpostavljaju da je kineskinja ili korejka.

Moje saznanje je ovako...
Karimov se borio protiv Islamista i radikalizacije i drzavna je de facto sekularna.
Ali istina je takva da je Uzbekistanski narod jako radikalan da se Krscani u Uzbekistanu zale da se vrsi velik pritisak a njih i da se muslimani jako lose odnose prema njima, pogotovo kad se prica o zaposljavanju.
Ako je narod takav a mislim da mi ovde valjda znamo da su muslimani svi takvi, sad poslje Karimova ocekujem radikalizaciju drzave.

Nažalost kao i uvijek nakon smrti takvih autoritativnih vladara dolazi do destabiliziraje a tu ima podloge.
Je li ostavio kakva nasljednika za poziciju?

Sovjeti su razgraničili ove tradicionalne regije (Fergana, Horezm, Karakalpakistan, Buhara, Samarkand i Suhandarija-Kaškadarija) upravnim granicama, očuvavši tako već postojeće gazdinske odnose među uzbečkim klanovima. Moć regionalnih klanova ovisila je od njihovih odnosa s Moskvom. Džadidi (muslimanski modernisti) iz Buhare bili su istaknuti među prvim elitama koje su vodile Uzbekistan. No, nakon što su pobijeni u Staljinovim čistkama 1937. - 1938., na vlast je došla taškentsko-ferganska frakcija. Ova frakcija izgubila je moć od Samarkandske frakcije pod dugim vodstvom Šarofa Rašidova (1959. - 1983.). Nakon Rašidovljeve smrti, Moksva je favorizirala taškentsko-fergansku frakciju. Samakrandska frakcija ponovno je došla na vlast u lipnju 1989. postavljanjem Imrana Karimova, koji je od tada vladao kao partijski sekretar.

U Uzbekistanu, različiti regionalni identiteti ukorijenjeni u različitim povijesnim iskustvima, etno-kulturalnim tradicijama, i socijalno-ekonomskim uvjetima ostali su vrlo snažni. Odrazili su se u borbi za vodeće pozicije u replubličkoj partijskoj organizaciji i vladi. Razdoblje između 1937. i 1957. obilježila je dominacija Taškentske i Ferganske frakcije, dok su pripadnici Samarkandske, Buharske i drugih frakcija bili otpremljeni na pozicije sekundarne važnosti. Oko 1957., balans moći se promijenio, te su središnje i zapadne frakcije postale glavni izvor vodećih kadrova. U ranim 1980-ima Taškentska i Ferganska frakcija povratile su supremaciju unutar republičke političke elite, no 1989. druga smjena donijela je moć Samarkandskoj frakciji.

Pošalji der mi njezino ime u pp :P

tokmače,pa pisao si da si se oženio prije neki dan,a već tražiš imena od drugih žena u pp...