I meni je palo na pamet da Kina možda jednostavno postavi 10 nosača aviona oko Tajvana, i izgura "savezničke".

Treba im još desetak godina do 10 nosača.

Ma Tajvan će pristati na tih 50 godina, samo žele odgoditi odbrajanje tih 50 godina.

Radije da počne 2030. odbrajanje ili 2035., nego danas.

Tako ustvari dobiju 60 ili 70 godina

Ali čim dođu na trenutak do invazije, ovi će potpisati.

Kupuju vrijeme i da se produži status quo, ko Bošnje sa Bosnom.

Ako Kina ne napravi žestoki pritisak (ekonomski, plus sve jače vojne prijetnje) Tajvan može ostati ovako vječno.

Znači ipak postoji jedan visoki level pritiska da se Tajvan natjera, ali to je puno više od verbalnih prijetnji ili okrznjavanja zračnog prostora.

Mislim da nisu ni blizu tome sada. Ali očito pojačavaju, pa koliko god treba, vjerojatno je zadnji maksimalni pritisak prije vojne opcije, totalna pomorska trgovačka blokada. Moguće je da bi ovi pukli puno prije, na samu najavu toga ili recimo djelomičnu blokadu (ostave jednu luku) uz najavu totalne.

Sve vaše pretpostavke o kineskom napadu računaju da apsolutno svi okolo ostanu neutralni i gledaju što se događa.

Osvajanjem Tajvana, pravljenjem umljetnih otoka, Kina se širi po pacifiku i postaje ozbiljna prijetnja za sve uključene, vidjeli smo

kako australce sada šopaju nukleanrim podmornica.a

Također Tajvan je na pračkomet do Japana koji je bio prva akvizicija Japanskog Carstva u 19. stoljeću kad su krenuli u ekspanziju.

Rat oko Tajvana Japan ne bi mirno gledao.

Kina će dakle izazvati ozbiljan rat tamo i bez amerike.

Sve vaše pretpostavke o kineskom napadu računaju da apsolutno svi okolo ostanu neutralni i gledaju što se događa.

Osvajanjem Tajvana, pravljenjem umljetnih otoka, Kina se širi po pacifiku i postaje ozbiljna prijetnja za sve uključene, vidjeli smo

kako australce sada šopaju nukleanrim podmornica.a

Također Tajvan je na pračkomet do Japana koji je bio prva akvizicija Japanskog Carstva u 19. stoljeću kad su krenuli u ekspanziju.

Rat oko Tajvana Japan ne bi mirno gledao.

Kina će dakle izazvati ozbiljan rat tamo i bez amerike.

Lupate gluposti Japan upravo prepravlja "nosače helikoptera" u nosače aviona. To je zemlja od 100+ milijuna stanovnika, koja prezire povijesno Kinu

i ima izuzetno militaristički duh dan danas.

Oni su br. 1 Američki saveznik, nikakve Koreje, Tajvani ili Australije.

Njih se ne smije nikada podcjeniti, pitajte Engleze kako su prošli u ww2 u okršaju s njima.

Lupate gluposti Japan upravo prepravlja "nosače helikoptera" u nosače aviona. To je zemlja od 100+ milijuna stanovnika, koja prezire povijesno Kinu

i ima izuzetno militaristički duh dan danas.

Oni su br. 1 Američki saveznik, nikakve Koreje, Tajvani ili Australije.

Njih se ne smije nikada podcjeniti, pitajte Engleze kako su prošli u ww2 u okršaju s njima.

Johannes "Hans" Friedrich Leopold von Seeckt (22 April 1866 – 27 December 1936) was a German military officer who served as Chief of Staff to August von Mackensen and was a central figure in planning the victories Mackensen achieved for Germany in the east during the First World War.

During the years of the Weimar Republic he was chief of staff for the Reichswehr from 1919 to 1920 and commander in chief of the German Army from 1920 until he resigned in October 1926. During this period he engaged in the reorganization of the army and laid the foundation for the doctrine, tactics, organization, and training of the German army.[1] By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of the Second World War. While Seeckt undertook multiple programs to get around the military limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles which formally ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers after World War I, he has been criticized for failing to expand the reserves of officers and trained men available to the army, the main obstacle to rearmament during the Republic.

Seeckt served as a member of parliament from 1930 to 1932. From 1933 to 1935 he was repeatedly in China as a military consultant to Chiang Kai-shek in his war against the Chinese Communists and was directly responsible for devising the Encirclement Campaigns, that resulted in a string of victories against the Chinese Red Army and forced Mao Zedong into a 9,000 km retreat, also known as the Long March.

Seeckt advised Chiang that China would need a 60 division army, which he proposed to arm with modern weapons and train in the combined arms operations which he had previously used in training the German Army in the 1920s.[81] Seeckt stressed he would need the best Chinese officers to train in modern warfare.

His goal was to make the National Revolutionary Army like the army in Germany after the war, a force which could make up for what it lacked in quantity with its high quality of professional soldiers.

In addition, Seeckt stressed he wanted an end to regionalism in the Chinese military. The army was to be led by officers who were loyal to Chiang alone, with no regional loyalties.

In addition, Seeckt urged Chiang to fortify the lower Yangtze valley, and to adopt policies to industrialize China to gain independence from Western manufacturing. To this end, Seeckt suggested a trade agreement between China and Germany, where Germany would receive minerals needed for weapon manufacture, especially tungsten, and China would be provided with weapons and the industrial machinery needed to make China self-sufficient in producing such weapons.

In March 1934, Chiang not only appointed Seeckt as his Chief Military Advisor, but also appointed him as the Deputy Chairman of the Military Affairs Council. In that capacity Seeckt chaired the twice weekly meetings at Nanjing between Chiang and his most senior generals. At a meeting at Mount Lu in 1934, Seeckt's plan for 60 divisions was adopted. To create that army, a 10-year plan was adopted. The officers trained by Seeckt were important later in the Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion of China.

In early 1934, Seeckt advised Chiang that to defeat the Chinese Communists he needed to employ a scorched earth policy, which required building a series of lines and forts around areas controlled by the Communists in the Jiangxi Soviet in order to force the Communist guerrillas to fight in the open, where the superior firepower of the Nationalists would give them an advantage.

Following Seeckt's advice, in the spring and summer of 1934 the Kuomintang built three thousand "turtle shell" forts linked by a series of roads while at the same time pursuing a scorched earth policy around the forts as part of the Fifth Bandit Extermination Campaign in Jiangxi. It was Seeckt's tactics that led to a series of defeats suffered by the Chinese Communists that finally in October 1934 led to the famous Long March.

Pomorska trgovačka blokada ti je objava rata u suštini, tako se na svaku blokadu uvijek gledalo. Od Napoleona preko ww1 do ww2

i rata na atlantiku s trgovačkim konvojima do Britanije.

Zbog trgovačke blokade Kube je skoro započeo 3. svjetski rat čisto da vas podsjetim s time se jako opasno igrati.

Amerikanci kao glavna pomorska sila bi tu blokadu probijali, šetali bi se okolo i dostavljali robu te se kreveljili Kinezima

pucajte ako smijete.

Ta strategija im ne bi uspjela, štoviše pokušati tako nešto je opasnije od blickrieg akcije zato što bi dali vremena americi

za promišljanje strateigje djelovanja i mobilizacije vojske, što bi dovelo do sukoba 300%.


Kineska najbolja šansa je iznenadni i brzi napad u petak, preko vikenda dok ne zasjeda UN.

Većina mladih na tajvanu je za samostalnost, to su ljudi koji su navikli živjeti u slobodi ali i militarističkom duhu zbog damoklovog mača.

Svi oni gledaju što se događa u Hong Kongu, znaju za logore i represivni sustav Kine, ako misliš da bi oni mirno gledali kako postaju roblje varaš se.

Štoviše Tajvan je u situaciji mega Vukovara, tada se stvara štakorski efekt, kad ne možeš pobjeći ili predati se jel znaš da milosti nema

tu bi nastao brutalan sukob do zadnjeg.

For many people in China and Korea it is a frightening thought – Japanese military forces at large in East Asia, as they were in the Thirties and Forties , when they invaded, conquered and oppressed people from Manchuria to Burma (Richard Lloyd Parry writes). This was the image evoked by a Beijing government spokesman after Japan’s deputy prime minister, Taro Aso, said that his nation would join the United States in defending Taiwan against any Chinese invasion.

“Japan’s militarism has committed countless crimes of aggression against China,” said Zhao Lijian, the deputy director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Beijing. “The fact that certain politicians are still nostalgic about Taiwan [a former Japanese colony] shows they have not learned a deep lesson from history.”

Aso’s remarks do indeed express a dramatic ongoing shift in Japanese security policy — but the idea of Japanese troops going into action, bombing Chinese ships or fighting on the beaches of Taiwan is a remote fantasy.

It was only in 2015 that Japan’s conservative government overturned a rule that barred its troops from operating with their allies overseas, a right renounced by previous governments in order to conform to the post-war “peace constitution”.

The change provoked bitter protests and widespread public unease. To overcome it, the government was obliged to emphasise the more benign applications of the Japan Self-Defence Forces’ new powers, such as for rescuing Japanese civilians in danger overseas and for humanitarian disaster relief.

The new laws would, in theory, permit the SDF to fight alongside the US if faced by a threat to national survival, and the government clearly wants to send a signal that it regards any threat to Taiwan’s de facto independence as a red line not to be crossed.

But even if it did come to war over the island, Japanese public opinion and the capacities of its military are a long way from being equal to a full combat role. Japan would almost certainly be limited to supporting the United States, with refuelling, logistics and the treatment and evacuation of casualties. But even this would be remarkable shift for a country whose armed forces were for decades strictly limited to the defence of their own territory.