Moguće je vrlo lako da se radi o drugim djelima. Naser bar ima dovoljno sela i zločina da mu kosti istrunu u nekoj tamnici da je pravde igdje na svijetu.

Inače, odgovornost za ratne zločine bi trebalo da je univerzalna, a srbijansko pravosuđe nije politizovano koliko bošnjačko ili hrvatsko.

Sirija, Irak... ISIL...Afganistan... izabrati po volji...

Pustice ga kao i sve njihove krvnike, ali nek bar malo greje dupe u zatvoru...



Upali hajducki u selo na Bozic 1993. i sve zivo pobili... nista to Hag, nevin tip, oslobodjen optuzbi...

I posle prica o pomirenju... nema pomirenja...

Oric and the Muslim forces - numbering between 4,000 and 6,000 men in three "brigades" - of which 30 to 50 percent were armed - ignored the Serb build-up and began their own reign of terror against Serb military and civilian occupants outside the towns of Bratunac, Skelani and Milici. The Muslims systemically raided Serb villages, killing their defenders and making off with their weapons and the villagers food. A Muslim batallion commander later stated:

"We were not ready for war. We had to attack to get arms and ammunition. We attacked south because the Serbs were weak there; they did not think we would dare to attack towards Serbia. Another important factor was food. We had to obtain food. We had many refugees from Zvornik, Bratunac, Rogatica and Han Pijesak...And anyway we simply wanted to liberate as much as possible of the Srebrenica municipality."

This raiding continued through June, July and August, as the Muslims looted and razed Serb villages and expanded their areas of control. Chuck Sudetic observed that Oric's combat troops were now being followed by a band of desperate civilians:

"Oric could now count on a force that struck the fear of God into the Serb peasants...a horde of Muslim refugees, men and women, young and old, who were driven by hunger and, in many cases, a thirst for revenge. Thousands strong, these people would lurk behind the first wave of attacking soldiers and run amok when the defenses around Serb villages collapsed. Some...used pistols to do the killing; others used knives, bats and hatchets. But most...had nothing but their bare hands and the empty rucksacks and suitcases they strapped on their backs. They came to be known as torbari, the bag people. And they were beyond Oric's control."

The Serbs were now tasting a particularly nasty version of their own medicine.

On 26 September Oric's men scored one of their biggest victories when they hit the village of Podravanje and the nearby hamlets, some 15 to 20 kilometres southeast of Milici, near the Srebrenica bauxite mines. At least 27 VRS soldiers were killed - early Serb reports claimed as many as 50 had died - and the territory gained allowed the Srebrenica fighters to link up with Avdo Palic's brigade in Zepa. The Muslims treated the Serbs - soldiers and civilians alike - with no quarter. Sudetic writes:

"The Serb fighters left behind men and women who had been wounded and killed...Then the torbari rushed in. Muslim men shot the wounded. They fired their guns into the bodies of the Serb dead, plunged knives into their stomachs and chests. They smashed their heads with axes and clubs, and they burned the bodies inside the buildings. Oric's men grabbed half a dozen prisoners; one, a fighter from Serbia who had relatives in Podravanje, was beaten to death, and the others emerged bruised and battered when they were exchanged a month later."

The Muslim attacks continued into October, as several villages 10 to 15 kilometres north of Skelani, right on the Drina River border with Serbia, were burned. In mid-December, more villages, about 10 kilometres southeast of Bratunac, were attacked and more than 50 Serbs killed. The VRS 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and the Skelani Batallion were powerless to stop Oric.

Oric was now ready for his next objective: to link up with the Cerska-Kamenica enclave to the northwest and overrun the entire Bratunac-Skelani area, pushing right to the Serbian border. This offensive, which kicked off successfully on 24 December, was to be his last campaign, however. Instead of final victory it would bring down the wrath of General Ratko Mladic, the VRS, and the Yugoslav Army.

Čitao sam neka svjedočanstva i iskreno je nejasno je li Naser imao zapovjednu odgovornost jer ko će definirati razliku između vojske i naoružanih civila.

Orić je oslobođen optužbi kako po individualnoj, tako i po komandnoj odgovornosti. Za razaranja u selima Kravica, Šiljkovići, Bjelovac, Fakovići i Sikirić, navodi se u presudi, optužba nije pružila uverljive dokaze da su za njih odgovorne bosanske snage, budući da su u tim selima vođene borbe u kojima su srpske snage koristile artiljeriju, a u slučaju Bjelovca čak i avijaciju.

Haška pravda...Srbi se sami se pobili.

Upali hajducki u selo na Bozic 1993. i sve zivo pobili... nista to Hag, nevin tip, oslobodjen optuzbi...

I posle prica o pomirenju... nema pomirenja...

„Planirani haos”, knjiga koju je objavio bivši poslanik Stranke demokratske akcije i predsednik Izvršnog odbora Srebrenice Ibran Mustafić, baca novo svetlo na ratna zbivanja u Srebrenici

U knjizi je i priča njegovog strica Ibrahima Mustafića: „Došao je Naser i rekao mi da se odmah spremim i krenem sa „zastavom” pred zatvor u Srebrenicu. Odmah sam se obukao i krenuo. Kad sam došao pred zatvor, izveli su sve zarobljene sa Zalazja i naredili mi da ih povezem prema Zalazju. Kada smo došli do deponije, naredili su mi da zaustavim i parkiram kamion. Izmakao sam se na pristojnu daljinu. Ali, kad sam video njihovo divljanje i kad je počelo klanje, prebledeo sam kao krpa. Kada je Zulfo (Tursunović) niz grudi sastavio nožem bolničarku Radu, pri tom je pitajući gde joj je radio-stanica, više nisam imao hrabrosti da to gledam. Peške sam sa deponije došao u Srebrenicu, a oni posle dovezli kamion, a ja sam sa kamionom nastavio kući u Potočare. Karoserija je bila sva krvava”.

Mustafić je zabeležio i ovu ispovest Nasera Orića: „Kada smo onu ekipu zarobljenih na Zalazju iz zatvora ponovo poveli prema Zalazju i kad je počelo klanje, meni je dopao Slobodan Ilić. Popeo sam mu se na prsa. Bio je bradat i čupav kao životinja. Gledao je u mene i nije progovarao ni reči. Izvadio sam bajonetu i direktno ga udario u jedno oko, a zatim provrtio nožem. Nije ni zapomagao. Zatim sam ga nožem udario u drugo oko. Nisam mogao da verujem da ne reaguje. Iskreno rečeno, tada sam se prvi put uplašio, tako da sam ga odmah posle toga preklao!”

Autor navodi da je u Tuzli saznao da je – posle napada na srpsko selo Ježesticu – „i Kemo sa Pala nosio po Srebrenici neku odsečenu glavu i plašio ljude”. „Ne znam tačno ali se priča da je (Kemo, čije prezime ne navodi) umešan i u likvidaciju Bate iz Srebrenice i njegove majke (Mihaila i Anđelije Stjepanović, prim. autora). Cvileli su, kažu, kao guje. Izgleda da su poklani”, zapisao je Mustafić. Za ubistvo teško obolelog Krste Dimitrovskog i njegove supruge Velinke, prema saznanjima autora „Planiranog haosa”, odgovoran je Ejub Golić, komandant Samostalnog brdskog bataljona iz sela Glogova, koga optužuje i za ubistvo dvojice Bošnjaka u jednoj srebreničkoj kafani.

Mustafić beleži i neke zasede koje su bošnjački vojnici iz demilitarizovane zone postavili između Bratunca i Skelana, odnosno Milića i Podravanja u kojima su ubili nekoliko boraca VRS. „Jasno mi je bilo da se zlo traži da bi se rešio problem Srebrenice”, zaključio je on.

Opisuje i šok koji je doživeo kada je saznao za napad bošnjačkih snaga na srpsko selo Višnjicu, u kojem su ubili nekoliko civila i spalili selo. Napadom su komandovali Ekrem Salihović i Ibrahim Mandžić Mrki. To mu je bio znak da je mafija rešila da „završi sa Srebrenicom” i stanovništvo „trpa pod četnički nož”.

Kada je Mandžiću rekao da ovakvim napadima „svesno stvaraju alibi četnicima za napad na Srebrenicu”, ovaj mu je odgovorio: „Nismo mi samoinicijativno otišli u akciju. Mi smo dobili naredbu iz Sarajeva”. Kasnije, tvrdi Mustafić, saznao je da je „naredbu za napade oko Srebrenice potpisao ’đeneral’ Enver Hadžihasanović.