Pa zar vam masakri počinjeni od strane "Hrvata" u nekim mjestima (Vrbanja, Stupni Do, Ahmići) jednostavno ne liče na neki plan. Meni itekako liče. I nakon toga olako prepuštanje Travnika, Bugojna, Vareša i potpuna nepripremljenost na sukobe.

Čini se da je dio ljudi oko Bobana sa podrškom Šuška iz Zagreba, kad su skužili da muslimani neće postat Hrvati i kad su već počeli muslimani težit islamskoj državi, jednostavno htio uzet od Hercegovine što se može i Livno i jednostavno to odnijet u Hr. Njima je tad bilo nepojmljivo da Posušje i Široki ne budu u Hrvatskoj. A srednja Bosna je njih onemogućavala u tome. Zapravo nisu se htjeli mislit hoće li Travnik biti u Hrvatskoj ili ne. Meni su neki ljudi iz Hercegovine često objašnjavali da mi u Bosni nismo pravi Hrvati. Srećom danas se tako nešto ne može čuti kad istim iz Hrvatske stižu slične izjave.

Upućuje to na još nešto, a to je dogovor Alija - Boban o kojem se pričalo a ne Boban-Karadžić, meni se čini da je tu bio dogovor ovo meni ovo tebi. Tu su Lašvanska dolina i Žepče pokvarili planove, hvala Blaškiću, no i oni bi brzo bili izgubljeni da se rat nastavio.
Sve je ovo išlo uz britansku asistenciju, njihovoj politici "rješavanja" problema, zato se i jesu u Ahmićima nacrtali i objašnjavali kako su mudžahedini spas za BiH.

Nekako su dolazili ljudi pravit nerede, uklanjalo se sposobne a muslimani su ko od šale zarobljavali zapovjednike, kod nas Totića u Zenici. A kad si obezglavljen onda teško možeš išta.

Možda danas ne bi imali problema da se ostvario Bobanov i Alijin naum samo nije moralo toliko ljudi poginut. Ni za što.

No hvala Franji na njegovoj opsesiji Banovinom, uvjeren sam da nije znao za ove dogovore, mislim da jedino tome i logorima u Hercegovini čije su slike obišle svijet, možemo zahvalit što danas postoji Kanton Središnja Bosna.

Da ne bude zabune ne treba Hercegovce krivit sa ovom pričom nego isključivo Šuška, Bobana i još par ljudi.

To pokazuje samo jedno: ne smijemo se dijelit. Svi Hrvati u BiH trebaju i moraju bit jedno tijelo. Slabi smo samo kad smo podijeljeni...

.. Nakon toga naprave Bobanovci par pokolja ovi pošalju TV ekipe da snime i tako opravdaju muslimansko zauzimanje srednje Bosne. Par općina Hercegovine se odvoji u Hrvatsku. A Srbi u Srbiju.

Najžešći Hrvati iz Hercegovine zadovoljni, obuhvatilo bi skoro pola Hrvata, Srbi zadovoljni, Muslimani zadovoljni s obzirom kako im je bilo prije toga, mada bi ostali bez istočnog Mostara ali njima ionako i nije stalo do Hercegovine. I riješen problem za MZ.

Bobanovci: Vrbanja (Bugojno), Ahmići (Vitez), Stupni Do (Vareš).

Kome je to trebalo?
Iz istog razloga i u isto vrijeme rade takve pokolje i Muslimani u sj. Hercegovini.

Englezima, Srbima, Muslimanima i Bobanovcima te
neodlučnim Hrvatima da ni ne pomišljaju da ostanu živjet s Muslimanima a nakon toga i obratno.

Sam si gore napisao da je čudan u to vrijeme dolazak velikog broj kadra iz JNA muslimana u ABiH, veliki broj Sandžaklija, talibana isto.

A za to vrijeme Alija lijepo strateški razmješta izbjeglice po srednjoj Bosni čime narušava ravnotežu i obećava Donjovakufljanima Uskoplje, Fočacima Kreševo i sl.

Srbi u to vrijeme zaustavljaju dejstva nakon Jajca i prema jednima i prema drugima. Puštaju da se ljudi pokolju i sve to lijepo Britanci potpomažu.

No predugo im je trajalo, Vitez i Bila su ključ svega, da su pali scenarij bi se ostvario.

A dečkima Vitez, Bila, Busovača, N. Travnik svaka čast, barem ovima koji nisu sudjelovali u pokoljima.

A sad kad ovako se pročita zar nema više smisla od plana Boban Karadžić o podjeli BiH na dva dijela koju mantraju u Sarajevu, taj plan (B-K) je imao veliku manu zašto nije bio moguć a to je 33% Hrvatske pod okupacijom.

Pa koliko je bilo mrtvih na hrvatskoj strani?

Nisam takav podatak nikad ni pročitao.

Taj tip mi je rekao da su oni doista misli spojit se sa Rovnom i dalje prema Kruščici preko Ahmića.

Dakle Ahmići su bili legitimni vojni cilj.

Ali otkud onoliko civila mrtvih i otkud kamere...

Ahmici

The HVO attack on the village of Ahmici on April 16 and the subsequent massacre of many of its Muslim inhabitants is perhaps the most notorious incident of the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia and has been at the center of at least five cases before the ICTY in which Bosnian Croat military and political leaders and HVO soldiers have been charged with war crimes.8 Although later portrayed by ICTY prosecutors as the epitome of Croat atrocities in central Bosnia, the events at Ahrnici on April 16 seem to have aroused little comment at the time-other than on the part of Lt. Col. Bob Stewart, the BRITBAT commander-and apparently did not become an issue for the Muslims until 1994-95.9 However, despite investigations by the United Nations and the governments of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, voluminous testimony before the ICTY by both Muslim and Croat witnesses, and the conclusions of ICTY prosecutors and judges, what actually happened in the village of Ahmici on the morning of April 16, 1993, and why, remain unclear. The most common interpretation is that the innocent Muslim inhabitants of the village were subjected to an unprovoked attack by HVO military police special operations forces. However, the available facts suggest a less fanciful alternative explanation: that Ahmici was a legitimate military target; that the village was defended by armed Muslim forces; that the OZCB commander, anticipating an attack by ABiH forces through the village, ordered a justifiable spoiling attack; and that the unit responsible for carrying out that attack, an element of the HVO 4th Military Police Battalion, either by premeditated design or in the heat of battle or both, went on a mindless rampage that included killing civilians and burning most of the Muslim section of the village.

The village of Ahmici was undoubtedly a legitimate military target for an HVO spoiling attack at the time by virtue of both its location and its probable use as an ABiH staging area. The village lies approximately three and one-half kilometers east of Vitez and on high ground some two hundred meters north of the main Travnik-Busovaca road. It is thus in a position to control the key route through the Lasva Valley at one if its most restricted points by direct and indirect fire.10 Muslim TO forces from Ahmici set up a roadblock near the village in October, 1992, to prevent the passage of HVO forces headed toward Jajce, and it was clearly identified by HVO intelligence sources at various times in March and April, 1993, as being astride the planned ABiH axes of attack into the Vitez area from the north and east. Given the proximity of the village to the Travnik-Busovaca road, it was the most likely assembly area for elements of the ABiH 325th Mountain Brigade and other ABiH forces tasked to make the attack across the road toward the Kruscica area on April 16.

Despite the repeated denials of senior ABiH commanders, on April 16 the village of Ahmici was clearly defended by local Muslim Territorial Defense forces as well as by ABiH elements staging for the attack across the Travnik-Kaonik road. The village is clearly marked on a captured ABiH operational map as being occupied by ABiH forces in January, 1993, and on April 11, 1993, Enes Varupa, a Muslim TO commander, recorded in his notebook that a TO company of at least eighty-five men was in the village on that date.11 Muslim TO members also met at their headquarters in the Zumara elementary school in Ahmici on April 11 to discuss plans for defending the village. Muslim forces in Ahmici were assigned "clearly defined tasks, to secure the line toward Nadioci," and trenches and a number of dugouts had been prepared.12 An HVO intelligence estimate dated April 10 placed elements of the ABiH 325th Mountain Brigade in the village, and elements of the ABiH 303rd Mountain Brigade were also ordered to support the Muslim forces in Ahmici. Croatian Defense Council sources also reported that the ABiH infiltrated thirty exceptionally well-armed soldiers into the village on Apri114. On the evening of the fifteenth, the Muslim forces in Ahmici increased their level of security. In addition to the regular guards, ten men were on standby in the lower part of the village, and the guard force in the upper part of the village was doubled. During the course of the fight for the village on April 16, the Muslim forces in the village were reinforced from Vrhovine, and reinforcements from Poculica and the 325th Mountain Brigade were promised but failed to arrive in time to affect the situation. The HVO assault forces encountered resistance, including shelling by the ABiH, and after the action they recovered weapons and large amounts of ammunition, including 7.62-mm and 12.7-mm machine gun ammunition and RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades.13

The HVO spoiling attack on Ahmici was planned on the afternoon and evening of April 15, and Pasko Ljubicic, commander of the 4th Military Police Battalion, briefed members of his command in the Hotel Vitez, noting that a Muslim message had been intercepted saying that the ABiH would attack in the morning on April 16 and that to forestall the attack the HVO would attack first. Ljubicic then issued orders for elements of the 1st Company to join the 4th Military Police Battalion's Antiterrorist Platoon (known as the "Jokers") at the "Bungalow," a former restaurant close to the road in Nadioci. At 1 :30 A.M. on the sixteenth, Colonel Blaskic, the OZCB commander, issued written orders for the 4th Military Police Battalion to block the Ahmici-Nadioci road (where he expected the Muslim attack) by 5:30 A.M. and to crush the enemy offensive. Further briefings were conducted at the Bungalow, and Ljubicic's second in command noted that several mujahideen had infiltrated into Ahmici during the night.14

The seventy-five-man assault force consisting of the "Jokers" and other elements of the 1st Company, 4th Military Police Battalion, augmented by a few local HVO members was divided into assault teams and moved out from the area of the "Bungalow" between 4:30 and 4:45 hours on the morning of the sixteenth. At 5:30, a single artillery round was fired-the agreed upon signal to start the assault-and the ground assault on the Muslim section of Ahmici was launched from the village's southeastern quadrant. Muslim forces in the lower part of the village resisted vigorously, and the attacking HVO troops immediately came under heavy Muslim fire.15 Muslim defenders barricaded in the mosque and the elementary school were supported by ABiH artillery, by light fire from the villages of Vrhovine and Pirici, and by snipers firing constantly from the woods and clearings above the village.

The Muslim fire was intense, killing three HVO military policemen and wounding three more.16 The HVO countered with intense mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire. Many buildings were set afire by tracers. At some point, whether by chance or by premeditated design, the responsible HVO commanders surrendered control of the situation, and what had been a legitimate, well-justified HVO spoiling attack deteriorated into a mindless rampage by the attacking HVO military policemen. Angered by earlier confrontations with the Muslims, the HVO attackers worked their way through the village using automatic weapons and grenades and killing men, women, and children in a cruel and indiscriminate manner.

Unable to stem the HVO advance and failing promised reinforcements from Poculica and the 303d and 325th Mountain Brigades, the Muslim defenders evacuated the remaining civilians toward Vrhovine. They briefly considered a last-ditch stand in the upper village (Gornji Ahmici) before withdrawing at about 4 A.M. on April 17 to establish a defensive line at Barica Gaj, some 150 meters north of Ahmici, where the Muslim line remained until the Washington Agreements in March, 1994. Those Muslim inhabitants remaining in the village after the HVO assault were subsequently taken to the camp in Donja Dubravica and held there for some time.

From a purely military point of view, the HVO spoiling attack at Ahmici was very successful. The planned Muslim attack across the Travnik-Busovaca road in the Ahmici area was completely disrupted and could not be resumed. However, the destruction in the village was horrific, and civilian casualties were appalling. Most of the Muslim houses in the lower village were burned, some with the inhabitants inside. Many houses were set afire by incendiary ammunition and grenades used in the assault, but others were no doubt deliberately "torched." According to some accounts, as many as 109 Muslim civilians, including women and children, died or were missing as the result of the combat action and deliberate killing by the enraged and out of control HVO assault troops. Once the events in Ahmici on April 16 became known, the behavior of the HVO troops was justly characterized as a massacre, and a great deal of effort subsequently has been expended to bring the perpetrators to justice. Although the HVO forces' actions on April 16, particularly with respect to the unarmed Muslim civilians in the village, undeniably merit condemnation regardless of the emotional state engendered by active combat, the fact remains that the assault began as a legitimate military operation: a spoiling attack to disrupt the planned ABiH attack through Ahmici to cut the Travnik-Busovaca road: To have ordered such a spoiling attack was no war crime, although the events that ensued may have reached that level of culpability. It seems clear that the tragedy resulted not so much from the design of senior HVO leaders but rather from the working of that fear, anger, and madness attendant on many combat operations. In that respect, at least, the tragic events at Ahmici bear afar stronger resemblance to those at My Lai than to those at Lidice or Oradour-sur-Glane.

3.6.1993 god kad je počeo sukob sa muslimanima veza sa Srbima bila odlična... Dobar dio naših ministara HVO Vlade Travnik u tom trenutku sjedio, pio, jeo i dogovaro evakuaciju sa Srbima na Vlašiću... Koliko se sječam predvodio ih Davor Kolenda koji je sad negdje u MO, kako sam čuo i o tom može reć više.. J Leutar, je isto imo dobre odnose sa Srbima... Ali opet je došla zapovijed za povlačenje... kako piše u zapovijedi zbog nepovoljnog razvoja situacije..