I plan to use this thread to discuss the idea of creating a Croatian entity within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are a number of threads in Croatian on the forum, but I want to have a thread in English.

The map that I am posting is to me a good starting point. This Croat proposal is built around the idea of non-contiguous areas.

If you look at the map below, the Bosniacs (in green) are in two areas, Bihac and then the Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla area. The Serbs (red) are in western Bosnia and in Eastern Bosnia. Croats (blue) are in northern Bosnia (Posavina), Southwest and central Bosnia plus part of Herzegovina. There are enclaves for Zepce-Komusina, Kraljeva Sutjeska-Vares and Usora

We trade some territory with the Serbs to create a compact Croatian region in Posavina and regain Komusina near Zepce, Stjepan Krst and several Croat villages near Ravno (Misljen, Do, Prhinje, and Kotezi) in Herzegovina. The yellow area would be an expanded Brcko district that would incorporate villages in the Srebrenik and Gradacac municipalities and the whole of the Pelagicevo municipality. One area that is missing is the creation of an enclave for Croats around Tuzla.

I grabbed this map off a different thread talking about the redrawing of Dayton's borders here: politika/razgranicenje-daytona-t1093-25.html

This map below shows some of the same general ethnic Croatian areas that would be returned to the Federation: parts Ljubija in Western Bosnia, Liskovica, near Jajce, Komusina, near Zepce, Stjepan Krst near Stolac. The main difference is that the request for areas in Posavina is considerably smaller than the map listed above.

Yes I do realize that the map isn't for a third entity, and I wanted to show some agreement of areas that we Croats feel should be returned in a land swap.

I think I made both of that map a long time ago
If I would have made them now I would take more territory for Croats in the west part of Travnik, Uskoplje, some Konjic enclaves etc...
Something like this...

Regarding first map; if we try to integrate Ljubija in Federation / Croatian federal unit then Muslims will do anything to get parts of Prijedor to. And that's what Serbs will never accept.

I like second map. Almoast every map of potential Croatian federal unit I saw was made with only croatian enclaves in central Bosnia. If we make line trough Lašva valley and take croatian parts of Travnik municipality we have compact territorry and west from that line are Muslims surounded, that's why they should accept their two or three enclaves, that would also assure that neither would wish to separate.

Ceha, is that south part of Bihać municipality Martin Brod region? Did HVO controled that region after liberation of West Bosnia.

I'm glad that you like it
Yes, that is Martin Brod, and HVO did control it before and after Dayton.
It was included in USK after 2000. and the election of first ilegal Federation goverment.....
I'm also glad that you like idea of muslim enclaves in Central Bosnia, because that would give us parity to our northern enclaves (Vareš-Sutiska,Žepče and Usora) and give us the garanties that they would not be economicaly or in some other way (for example with highways) in lower position.
Parity.
It also gives garanties that seperation is impossible.
On the second map, yellow area of Brčko district could be enlarged by town of Modriča altough today that would only serve Serbian intrest as that would enlarge serbian percentage in district...

I think that Brčko must stay as an district in '91 borders, but could be composed from 3 or 4 ethnic municipalitys. Croatian municipality Ravne-Brčko within the district would be composed of western part plus croatian villages ond eastern part of district Boće, Boderište, Zovik and Štrepci. Muslim municipality would combine villages in central part of district from southern border of district (Rašljani) to the Brka village. Serbian part would be composed from serbian majority villages in the east and few smaller willages on the western part (Bukvik, Gajevi, Vujičići). The city would be the fourth municipality. It would be composed of city Brčko and its suburb - Gredice, Čadžavac, Omerbegovača, Brod, Grbavica. This part of district would be "multiethnic".

This kind of division could be also appropriate in other biger municipalities (Travnik, Tuzla, Prijedor, could also Kotor Varoš, Teslić, Derventa etc.) composed from compact ethnic territories.

Well, that would be something which would be great for us, but unfortunately I think it has a low probability of happening
Municipal borders of 1991 were not natural in many cases so they should not be treated as a holy cow.
In our interes would be smaler municipalities, so that a majority of croatian settlments would be in Croat municipalities (the same goes from 2 other nations).
That is the main base for the proposal for englargement of Brčko district. I doub't that Muslims/Bosniaks and Serbs would alow Croat municipalities in northern Srebrenik, Pelagicevo etc. so it would be better that thay have some rights in BD than none in other units.
Of course it would be great if I am wrong
No matter of that municialisation of BD is a great idea.

If we look at the map of "Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina" it's obvious that former municipalities aren't treated as holly cows. But problem is that in most cases of border revisions were made for the benefit of Serbs and Muslims. Our Croatian negotiators didn't shown much interest for many settlemenst which were on or by the border line.

New Croatian municipalities after Dayton are only Dobretići (which should be part of Jajce municip.), Usora, Žepče (borders revision on north region Novi Šeher) and Ravno.

If you look the map below you can se that the Serbs and Muslims negotiated new borders and municipalities trough whole demarcation line betwen RS and FBiH.

For new readers, there was a thread that that addressed the issue of why certain villages/areas were not included when they drew up the Dayton borders, but could have been easily included in the Federation. You can seen see the discussion and maps here: topic1093.html

When I think about a Croatian entity in BiH I don't think about destabilizing the country but stabilizing it. I think we have several factors at work here with the three groups and their goals.

1) Croats want to ensure they are properly represented in the Federation and BiH as a whole via legitimately elected representatives. The fact Zeljko Komsic was elected by our neighbors and not the Croats shows that certain groups want to diminish the Croatian presence in BiH. I think this will backfire. I also think that the idea that the Croats want to create an entity that is comprised of several enclaves assures people that this project is not some separatist project but for stabilizing this fractured country.

2) Serbs want to hold on to their war prize the "RS" and 49% of Bosnia that they managed to negotiate/save. Dodik's statements to the effect that he supports a Croatian entity are so that he can strengthen his position and ensure that the Croats and muslims squabble over the pieces. What I think Dodik fails to realize that no one would let the RS leave Bosnia and Herzegovina and certainly not in those borders

3) Muslims feel that they are the central party in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the recent moves by supposedly "multi-ethnic" party SDP, shows that they, along with their leader Zlatko Lagumdzija and is pseudo-Croatian lackey Zeljko Komsic are increasingly trying to consolidate some power in the hopes of centralizing the state, but that will not go over well with the other groups. So those groups that want to centralize the state would be the big losers here.

So if we realize the above and the fact that the only thing Dayton really accomplished was nothing other than stopping the fighting, and if the country is becoming fractured maybe now is a good time to start looking at a way to keep it whole and stabilize the country so that groups can't grab power (ie SDP) at the expense of others (Croats) then we might have a shot.

While I think Dodik (on paper) like the Serbs on this forum might tell you that the redrawing of borders especially of the RS is not acceptable or an option, I think a lot of Serbs might be willing to do border modifications to take some pressure off the RS off.

I'm sure many Serbs in Banja Luka remember that they were ready to leave should Croatian forces have taken the city in 1995, and probably the entire western portion of Bosnia. I also think that despite everyone's universal dislike of ex-Croatian president Stipe Mesic, he did have something like 90% of the public support when he said that if the RS tried to declare independence he would send in the Croatian army into Posavina. Now the reality of some armed conflict erupting is probably slim to none but it shows that the RS does have pressures on it.

I think realistically we could probably realistically negotiate a deal with the Serbs regarding areas like: Liskovica near Jajce, the parish of Stjepan Krst (Ljubljenica, Dabrica, Gornji and Donji Brstanik and Stjepan Krst) near Stolac, the area of Komusina near Zepce, and maybe a few Croatian villages near Ravno (Misljen Do, Kotezi and Prhinje). These loss of these areas would not be a detriment to the RS. Just as an FYI the Croats would be willing to trade Grahovo, Glamoc and Drvar to the Serbs.

But the real sticking point would be the region of Posavina in northern Bosnia (or the corridor) that connects the two halves of the RS. It was a majority Croat area and we could possible return more Croats in Posavina than the areas I listed above. Obviously the Serbs do not like that kind of solution as it splits the RS into two pieces, and as I stated earlier the idea of having enclaves is better for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it would be less likely for any group to separate. But keep in mind the RS is split in two because of the Brcko District which is a separate entity that is neither in the RS or the Federation.

Another difficult redrawing of borders would be with the muslims. As I pointed out above they have strong centralist tendencies, and would be less likely to agree to another ethnically based region. The muslims, for the record are split into two enclaves, the Bihac enclave in the far west and the Zenica, Tuzla, Sarajevo pocket. In some areas we could delineate that border without too much difficulty, but in others like the central part of Bosnia would be hard. I also doubt that they would welcome the creation of a Croat municipality around Tuzla or Vares/Kraljeva Sutjeska which would add a couple more Croat islands in addition to Usora, a possibly enlarged Zepce municipality assuming Komusina were added to it and not to mention whatever the Croats would get from the region of Jajce strething through Travnik and down to Kiseljak.

Keeping their centralist tendencies in check would probably allow the Croats and maybe to some degree the Serbs to feel a little more comfortable in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Yes I do realize that this is one side (Croats) versus two (the Serbs and Muslims) when it comes down to a territorial revision because Croats would gain a more legitimate representation and the opportunity to focus on further developing their areas and allowing for a possible return of more Croats to Bosnia. So for us it is win-win.

I don't see why the international community is so opposed to this. The country is falling apart anyway and at some point the people in BiH may just ignore what these European officials dictate and then what?

Great analysis Stecak, but this is the most important part of it:

I definately agree. Municipal borders should be rearenged.
However, on that last map Busovača, N.Travnik and Jajce should not be colored as green (it is a question how many muslims are in there).
Also in Fojnica there is only about 65% (according to the net) , which is less than 2/3.
Similar situation is (I think) also in Travnik.
In Bosnian Petrovac there exists Serbian majority, and Osmaci and Vukosavlje have Bosniak majority (but most of this are ony conclusions made from election results).
Moreover on this map Brčko is divided, but that is not the case in RL.
There is also difference in Bužim, Ćelić/Lopare (new muslim municipalities) and Bihać (which expanded to include Martin Brod and west of former Drvar municipality).

I fully agree

Thanks Ceha and MRSHO!

I know some people are thinking “Well if you Croats want to stabilize Bosnia then why not join forces with Zlatko Lagumdzija instead of forming your own entity? Lagumdzija seems like he has Bosnia’s best interests at heart and the Croatian member of the presidency is Zeljko Komsic who is also in Lagumdzija’s SDP.”

Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not work like that and they never did and probably never will. The main reason is that there was never ever any pan-Bosnian political consciousness. For most of Bosnia’s political history, and more importantly during recent times the region was ruled by a strong central force that decided what would be good for the people. The only point in Bosnia’s recent history when something like that should have developed prior to 1991 was during Austro-Hungarian times, and even then when Austria-Hungary tried to push a “Bosnian” identity it failed miserably.

So faced with that history it is no surprise then, that Zlatko Lagumdzija and other muslim political parties are trying to centralize the state. It is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political tradition to be ruled by a central authority. So to answer the first part of the question as to why we don’t join forces with Lagumdzija the short answer is that his vision will be to decide what is best for Croats and not the Croats themselves, which is where Zeljko Komsic comes in.

Through a loophole in the election laws, the candidates for the three presidencies (Croat, Serb and muslim) are decided in an open vote. If memory serves, the Serb president is decided by voters in the RS and the Croat and muslim leader are decided by the federation voters. That means that when a muslim goes to vote in the federation, he has an open ballot and not an ethnic one. So basically Lagumdzija exploited that loophole and was able to engineer an SDP victory for a supposedly Croatian representative to the rotating presidency, by picking someone he knew might appeal to muslim voters. Basically the Croatian people were outvoted by the muslims and the latter decided who would represent Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It doesn’t seem very fair, does it? Nor does it express the legitimate will of the Croatian people, who mostly voted against Zeljko Komsic and the SDP as a whole.

This form of centralization that Lagumdzija is trying to achieve is to create an artificial pan-Bosnian political consensus by engineering the SDP into the central position of the BiH political scene. But for Lagumdzija this has not been as smooth a ride as he anticipated. By ignoring the legitimate Croatian political will in the aim to shut out “evil” nationalists (don’t forget the SDP is a descendant of the old communist party and ideology that views nationalism as bad) Lagumdzija has plunged Bosnia and Herzegovina into a political crisis by not being able to form a government. That deadlock continues today. Read more: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article ... government

So basically Lagumdzija and his allies do not want to see a Croatian entity formed because it is “bad” for Bosnia but at the same time he has plunged the country into a crisis by trying to forcibly centralize the politics of it. Keep in mind that even predominantly left-leaning Croatia which until recently had adopted a “hands off” policy regarding Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina urged Sarajevo to recognize the legitimately elected Croat representatives.

Lagumdzija and his allies see a Croatian entity as “bad” for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole because it is a nationalist project and goes against their desires to centralize the government, starting with the federation and possibly ending when the whole country is centralized.

This centralization would be at the expense of the Serbs and the Croats who would feel marginalized, and maybe get past their old animosities to work together. Milorad Dodik the leader of the RS has already said he would support a Croatian entity, BUT it would be for weakening the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Dodik can pit the Croats and muslims against each other he wins by somehow separating the RS while the two other groups are distracted.

Dodik himself has not shown any real pro-Croatian sentiment. Out of the Croats who once lived in the territory that became the RS, very few have returned. Returnees are intimidated and other obstacles are put in place for it to make it not worth returning. The largest concentration of Croats in what is now the RS was in the northern part of Bosnia, known as Posavina, or the corridor that connects the two halves of the RS. If Dodik can keep the RS as is and keep Croats from returning to sensitive areas, and endorse a Croat entity built on the territory of the Federation, he wins.

What we have seen so far are two scenarios that destabilize Bosnia. One is a forced centralization of the country, vis-a–vis Zlatko Lagumdzija, with the aim of marginalizing two ethnic groups (Serbs and Croats), the other, courtesy of Milorad Dodik, is a devolution of the country with the aim of destroying it, by pitting two of the ethnic groups against each other and then sneaking out the back door.

So looking at the formation of a Croatian entity against these two scenarios it looks bad and not worth attempting because it destabilizes the country.

In a way I liken the creation of the Croatian entity to the creation of the predominantly Croatian municipality of Usora in northern Bosnia. The municipality of Usora is comprised of Croatian villages that straddled the pre-war borders of the Tesanj and Doboj municipalities. You can see a map here I don’t think Croats amounted to 30% as a whole in either municipality and if it hadn’t been for the war, the municipality might not have been created. I can assure you that Zlatko Lagumdzija would not be for the creation of Usora either.

Yet with the creation of it, Croats have been able to create a political center in the region that can now focus on the local needs of the people, which might not have been the case had those villages stayed divided by the municipal borders, because they would be told from Doboj or Tesanj what would be good for them. Not to mention the municipality has proved to be economically viable as demonstrated by this report on the municipality:



An economically viable municipality can invest in Croatian language schools and media and secure the existence of Croats in what could have been a marginal area.

The creation of the Usora municipality has not endangered or destabilized the country, and as I said in my previous post, the creation of a Croatian entity should be seen as a stabilizing force for the country.

It would act as a balance to centralizing tendencies of Sarajevo and the separatist aspirations of the RS. I think if it were presented in that capacity then I don’t think the international community would be against it. It would be a better choice to support the Croatian entity than some OHR that is now located in its ivory tower in Vienna that hopes to govern an unsustainable political framework by remote control and which is supporting Zlatko Lagumdzija who is destabilizing the country.

And really if the Croatian entity is composed of non-contiguous areas such as Usora and which would cut the RS into two pieces, you would have a hard time arguing that it would be "bad" for Bosnia.

Stecak, I'll get back to you this week on your analysis and add my own. Good stuff thus far.

Hello, I found this fascinating forum recently, it is really interesting to read not what American journalists write, but what local people think.

I also saw the above ethnic results of the census from 1991 for Bosnia and Hercegovina. What a shame people cannot go back to living where they did then - the loss of this ethnic mosaic is really a tragedy.

I will be in Bosnia this summer - are there any areas where the people still live together as before - Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim? The "cleansed" version of Bosnia is not so interesting.

The most mixed areas are those which Croats (Catholic by confession if you wish) had controlled during the war and now have political majority. There were no obstructions for returners after Dayton peace agreement by local governments in predominatly Croatian municipalities what we can't say for any of Serb or Muslim municipality.

For example, municipalities Drvar, Grahovo and Glamoč have today serb majority in local governemnts but are part of predominatly croatian "Heceg-Bosna Canton". That's because Serbs had no opsticals and returned in impressive number compared to Muslim (Vareš, Kakanj, Bugojno...) or Serb (Derventa, Bosanski Brod..) held municipalities from which tens of thousands Croats were displaced...

Same with "capital" cities, Republic of Srpska capital Banja Luka and Muslim held capital Sarajevo are ethnic clean cities, unoffical croatian capital city Mostar has just over 60% Croats.

That's from political wiev, but in everiday life those blue, red and green coluors from political maps are mixed. People live next to, work and cooperate with their neigbours of diferent nationalities.

Great, thanks very much for the info.

Btw, I was speaking with a girl from central Bosnia, she sees herself as a Bosnian, but goes to a Catholic church on Sundays. But she is not a Croatian, she says she has nothing in common with Croats.
How very complicated.......

I can't wait to read your analysis. This week, I had wanted to compare the Croatian entity with a working and territorially non-contiguous model in another part of the world, but these last few days have slipped right by...

When people ask about a non-contiguous or disconnected model of territorial autonomy and ask how can it work?

The answer is that it can - if you set it up right.

Today I want to take a look at what I think is a pretty good example of such an entity and we don't have to go to far out of the region to find it. I am talking about the example of Gagauz-Yeri (or Gagauzia) in Moldova.

Moldova is a country that is has seen and is dealing with the sprectre of ethnic division. In the early 1990s that came to da head when Russians and Ukrainians declared an independent Transnistria in the east of the country and the Turkic Gagauz declared independence in the south of the country.

The map of Transnistria is in red and you can read more about the region here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria



What I do want to focus on is the Gagauz who are a small ethnic group in Moldova. They speak a Turkic language and are unusual in that they are Orthodox Christians. They have traditionally been pro-Russian and were aligned with Transnistria.

Moldova essentially bought off the Gagauz and gave them a pretty good deal on autonomy and you can read it in detail here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gagauzia

What is interesting is that the map of Gagauzia is comprised of several enclaves, shown as grey in the south of the country:



A more detailed map of Gagauzia's internal structure is here:



The ethnic composition is as follows: (pulled out of wikipedia)

127,835 (82.13%) Gagauz
8,013 (5.15%) Bulgarians
7,481 (4.83%) Moldovans1
5,941 (3.82%) Russians
4,919 (3.16%) Ukrainians
486 (0.31%) Roma (Gypsies)

Keep in mind that in the whole of Moldova there are 147,500 Gagauz, so the vast majority of the Gagauz are contained in the autonomous region.

I am posting a few details about the autonomy deal from the Wikipedia article on Gagauzia:

The autonomy of Gagauzia is guaranteed by the Moldovan constitution and regulated by the 1994 Gagauz Autonomy Act. If Moldova decided to unite with Romania, Gagauzia would have the right of self-determination.[5][6] The Gagauzian People's Assembly (Adunarea Populară; Gagauz: Halk Topluşu) has a mandate for lawmaking powers within its own jurisdiction. This includes laws on education, culture, local development, budgetary and taxation issues, social security, and questions of territorial administration. The People's Assembly also has two special powers: it may participate in the formulation of Moldova's internal and foreign policy; and, should central regulations interfere with the jurisdiction of Gagauz-Yeri, it has the right of appeal to Moldova's Constitutional Court.

The highest official of Gagauzia, who heads the executive power structure, is the Governor of Gagauzia (Moldovan: Guvernatorul Găgăuziei; Gagauz: Bashkan). He or she is elected by popular suffrage for a four-year term. He has power over all public administrative bodies of Gagauzia, and is also a member of the Government of the Republic of Moldova. Eligibility for governorship requires fluency in the Gagauz language, Moldovan citizenship, and a minimum age of 35 years.

Permanent executive power in Gagauz-Yeri is exercised by the Executive Committee (Comitetul Executiv or Bakannik Komiteti). Its members are appointed by the Governor, or by a simple majority vote in the Assembly at its first session. The Committee ensures the application of the laws of the Republic of Moldova and those of the Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri.

As part of its autonomy, Gagauzia has its own police force.

Of note the Gagauz have set up a university in the Gagauz language. Turkey has been active as a cultural ambassador. Turkey urged the Gagauz to pitch the Cyrillic alphabet that was used in writing Gagauz and assisted with the development of a Latin based alphabet for the Gagauz. We should also point out as far as I know, this is is the first time EVER that the Gagauz have been able to acheive this level of autonomy and obviously to develop and protect their culture at the local level and nationally. So while the situation with Transnistria remains frozen we can say that the issue with the Gagauz has been settled. It also shows maturity on the part of the Moldovan government for accomodation.

This is a model that has been working for over 16 years. If Moldova could resolve the issue with the Gagauz, why can't the Croatian question in Bosnia and Herzegovina be addressed in a similar fashion?

Nothing that the we Croats have asked for with regards to the entity is unprecedented. Case in point - look at the Gagauz. Not to mention that the Gagauz model has been floated around for resolving autonomy demands elsewhere, including Iraq: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1090599.html

Similar to the Gagauz, we Croats mostly agree that an entity made of separate enclaves is a good starting point. There might be some debate as to details of what we think should optimally be in the entity and maybe a few other details.

I again argue that faced with the extremes of centralization from Sarajevo and separatism from Banja Luka this is a very appealing middle ground for the country even if people in Sarajevo and Banja Luka do not share my vision for this.

ALSO areas that would fall under the Croatian entity, especially those now in the RS for example, might be invigorated by the potential return of Croats to their pre-war homes, because they would feel more comfortable returning. I don't see anything bad with that and I think it is a good thing for Bosnia if people returned to their pre-war homes and if they are given the opportunity could revitalize the local economies. That in turn would help the larger economy and if Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina had legitimate opportunities to develop Croatian culture then we could really say that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-ethnic country.

I like this one; Three cities and twenty-three communes were included in the Autonomous Gagauz Territory: all localities with over 50% Gagauz, and those localities with between 40% and 50% Gagauz which expressed their desire to be included as a result of referendums to determine Gagauzia's borders..
With changes of municipality borders that would fix pretty much borders of entity.

Ceha if you look at the demographics of the settlements in Gagauzia there are a only a few in which the Gagauz did not account for 50% of the population but maybe those settlements saw it in their advantage to be in Gagauzia.

I agree if you change the borders of the municipalities it would help define the entity. I also want to point out that obviously not all Croats would be in the entity, BUT with an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina we would be able act as a voice for Croats nationwide and create mechanisms, like Croatian schools in areas outside of the entity.

What does everyone think of this possible division of Bosnia?

Because of the impossibility to avoid cutting the Bosniak lands in two, I included the following municipalities in Republika Srpska: Dobretici, Zepce, Usora. These three municipalities would have to choose to either remain with the Bosniaks or to join with the Serbs.

In this case, Croats have to give Žepče, Usora and Jajce to Moslims, and also Drvar, Glamoč and Grahovo to Serbs.

At the same time, Croats receive nothing back, except of (very) little parts of Middle Bosnia, such as Bilalovac and Kaćuni. This map is completely unacceptable for Croats. There's no discuss about it.

Absolutely!

lider and pessimus agreed!

gnr25: I think my concept went over your head. The whole point of what I was suggesting is that everyone is "cut in two" and that this arrangement would be beneficial to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole because it would be impossible to form external borders.

That's why we could say keep enclaves like Jajce-Dobreteci, Usora, Zepce, Soli, and Kraljeva Sutjeska-Vares within a Croatian entity.

I think most of us here on the forum agree that we would give Drvar, Glamoc and Grahovo in return for strategic Croatian areas, like Posavina, Komusina, Stjepan Krst and a few other places.