Inače, regionalni proxy rat Irana i SA se sve više intenzivira. Iranci su im zašli u mrtvi kut u Jemenu i sad je cijela panika nastala.

Jedino je pitanje je li se Iran malo preračunao i previše rastegnuo resurse.

Inače, regionalni proxy rat Irana i SA se sve više intenzivira. Iranci su im zašli u mrtvi kut u Jemenu i sad je cijela panika nastala.

Jedino je pitanje je li se Iran malo preračunao i previše rastegnuo resurse.

S druge strane, u Jemenu će SA potrošiti više sredstava nego Iran, budući da Iran i nema svoju vojsku izravno tamo. Jedini je problem u tome što SA ima više sredstava pa joj se može, te što su s ovime uvukli i Egipat aktivno na stranu SA i time solidarizirali sunitski svijet protiv sebe.

Jemen ima jednu veliku pogodnost za vođenje gerilskog rata, a to je planinska konfiguracija terena u sjevernom (šijitskom) dijelu zemlje, u kojem živi i jedno 70% stanovništva.

Svakako, bit će zanimljivo.

Highly informative article about the fall of Idlib

– Guest post for Syria Comment by Aron Lund, editor of Syria in Crisis

On March 28, Syrian rebels and jihadi fighters announced that they had captured the city of Idlib, posting pictures and videos online that showed them in control of government buildings and other landmarks. This followed a lightning offensive of several days, by a coalition of Sunni Islamist militias that assaulted the city from several directions.

After the security forces of President Bashar al-Assad violently put down protests inside the city in 2011 and 2012, resistance had been relegated to the countryside. With most of the surrounding Idlib Province captured, rebels had in the past year slowly but surely increased pressure on the city itself. They repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to block access roads as a way to force concessions and prisoner exchanges, which must have been a demoralizing experience for pro-Assad forces inside the city. In December 2014, the bell tolled for Idlib City, when the opposition overran the long-besieged Wadi Deif base, freeing up hundreds of crack rebel fighters for new campaigns.

At the time of writing, the situation remains unstable and it cannot be ruled out that Assad’s forces will launch a counterattack from areas still under their control. The government-run SANA news agency only speaks of “repositioning forces” in the southern neighborhoods of the city. Still, the apparent collapse of government defenses in Idlib has punched a gaping hole in the government’s narrative of approaching victory and boosted the opposition politically as well as militarily, spelling trouble for Bashar al-Assad.

A Sign of Government Overstretch

Out of thirteen provincial capitals, Idlib is only the second to be lost to the government, after the northeastern town of Raqqa was captured in early 2013. And like Raqqa, Idlib is a regional center rather than a major city – it would not fit on a top-five list over Syria’s most important cities. But the blow is heavy nonetheless.

The government remains much stronger than any rebel group on the national level, controlling perhaps two thirds of the population. Assad’s semi-cohesive central leadership and his control of a fully functional air force makes him Syria’s by far most powerful political actor, but his regime suffers from serious shortcomings nonetheless. It lacks enough reliable troops to conduct multiple offensives while also controlling its current territory and has been forced to farm out sensitive security tasks to local militias and Iranian-backed Shia Islamist foreign fighters.

Meanwhile, the state-run economy is withering, with a currency crisis and increasingly debilitating lapses in the fuel supply system and electricity production. The falling oil price is likely to cap Russian and Iranian support at levels too low to sustain the current ambitions of their Syrian ally. In short, it seems that Assad is still trying to bite off more of Syria than he can swallow, and the recent defeat in Idlib underlines how dangerously overstretched his regime has become.

The Islamic Emirate of Idlib?

The fall of Idlib is not without its risks for the rebels. Previous attempts by opposition groups to govern urban areas in Syria have been disastrous failures. Of course, a major reason has been Assad’s systematic bombings of civilian areas and infrastructure, which have killed and maimed tens of thousands of Syrians and forced millions out of their homes – a treatment now likely to be extended to Idlib. Even so, the rebels themselves are far from blameless. They have by and large failed to produce anything other than chaos and economic collapse, with what they refer to as liberated territory now suffering from chronic infighting, predatory criminal bands, and the brutal imposition of ultra-conservative Islamist norms. Most infamously, Raqqa has since its capture in 2013 transformed into a local capital of sorts for the self-declared Islamic State.

In the case of Idlib, many different groups were involved and all of them are hostile to the Islamic State, but the offensive appears to have been spearheaded by jihadis from the al-Qaeda-aligned Nusra Front and the large Islamist faction known as Ahrar al-Sham. While there are important sources of friction between these two groups – Ahrar al-Sham refuses to endorse al-Qaeda’s anti-Western attacks and is seeking local allies to avoid being swallowed up by the Nusra Front’s increasingly bold bid for hegemony in Idlib – they are both overtly anti-democratic, hostile to religious minorities, and committed to establishing a Sunni Islamist theocracy in Syria.

There is already great concern in the United States and Europe over the riseof jihadi groups in Syria. Now, early headlines in the Western press speak of a city that has “fallen into the hands of al-Qaeda,” which is hardly the kind of coverage that Syrian rebels were looking for.

This will be a serious problem for the rebels in the coming weeks and months. If Idlib becomes the scene of public floggings and streetside executions of “immoral” women, such as the Nusra Front has committed elsewhere in Idlib Province, or if it collapses into a turf war between rival groups, it would not only weaken more moderate rebel factions – it would also provide Bashar al-Assad with an opportunity to turn military defeat into political gain.

Where Next?

Militarily, however, the Idlib defeat puts Assad in a difficult spot as he needs to foresee the next rebel assault and deploy accordingly. Rebels already controlled most of the Idlib Province, but some pro-regime pockets remained apart from the provincial capital – notably the twin Shia towns of Fouaa and Kefraya, near the Sunni Islamist-controlled town of Binnish to the northeast of Idlib City. On March 27, Ahrar al-Sham announced that it had cut the last remaining supply route via Idlib City to Fouaa and Kefraya, meaning that these towns will now have to sue for peace with the rebels or risk destruction and perhaps a sectarian massacre.

To the south of Idlib City, the government controls a string of towns in the northern Jabal al-Zawiya region, the largest being Ariha, that served to supply forces inside Idlib. If that is no longer an objective, the regime may decide to abandon some of them to focus on defending territory of larger strategic value. However, at the other end of the road controlled by Ariha, we find the city of Jisr al-Shughour which connects the Idlib province to the Sunni-populated and rebel-friendly northern areas of Latakia Province. While Jisr al-Shughour is of little value in itself, Assad will presumably be reluctant to allow for increased pressure on his strongholds on the Alawite-majority coast. According to some sources, the government transferred its provincial government offices from Idlib to Jisr al-Shughour already two weeks ago.

South of Jisr al-Shughour lies the Ghab area of Hama, a heavily irrigated agricultural plain that butts into the Idlib Province alongside the Alawite Mountains. This religiously mixed powder keg has seen fierce fighting and may be of particular value to some rebel groups – for example, many of the founding fathers of Ahrar al-Sham hailed from villages in the Ghab. It is also possible that rebels from Idlib could move further south past Khan Sheikhoun and the battleground town of Morek, thereby attempting to put pressure on Hama, Syria’s fourth-largest city. It is a Sunni stronghold that has remained under Assad’s rule but could prove difficult to control once rebels gather critical mass on its outskirts. A rebel advance on Hama would certainly force the army to concentrate forces there, even at the expense of other fronts.

To the east, there is another very attractive target: the Abu Duhour air base. Capturing it would not only hobble Assad’s air campaign, it would also open up an area of coherent rebel control from the Turkish border to the desert south of Aleppo. In so doing, the rebels would also expose Assad’s only remaining supply line into Aleppo, a desperately improvised logistics trail through the rural towns of Khanaser and Sfeira that would be tremendously difficult to defend against multi-pronged attacks, especially if air cover falters. Under that scenario, the rebels could turn the tables on Assad in Aleppo, threatening his control over the city by cutting it off entirely from the rest of Syria.

At the end of the day, however, Idlib City is of limited value in itself. It is possible that the regime will counterattack or that none of the scenarios sketched out above will materialize. But considering the military and economic resources invested by Bashar al-Assad in its defense over the past four years, the loss of Idlib would undoubtedly signal to many of his supporters that the government’s current strategy is untenable in the long term.

U ovom trenutku rekao bih da jest. Trebali su pričekati desetak godina i fokusirati se na ono što im je bitno - a to su Sirija i Libanon. Ostalo može čekati.

Htio sam cijenjenim forumašima već odavno postaviti jedno pitanje. Nemojte žuriti sa odgovorom, dobro razmislite.

To što Assad i Alaviti zračnim napadima ubijaju sunni djecu. Sa filozofskog i moralnog aspekta može li se to ikada opravdati ako znaš 100% da će ta djeca kad odrastu htjeti klati, ubijati i genocidirati Alvite/Shia ?

Islam to generira, i ta djeca nemaju nikakve šanse kad odrastu biti bolji od svojih očeva.

Teško pitanje.

Islam je uništio moral i izvrnuo sve moralne vrijednosti na Bliskom Istoku.
Ja osobno za smrt svakog sunni djeteta krivim njihove roditelje jer su pokretali sunni islamsku revoluciju. Ta revolucija jasno ima cilj genocid nad onima koji nisu sunni.

Da su pravili sekularnu revoluciju krivac bi jasno bio Assad.

Ashley Johnston hailed as the Kurds' hero in Sydney funeral

When Amanda Johnston identified her son's body in Canberra just days ago, she first gently slapped, then kissed, the young man who had been torn apart by AK47 bullets in northern Syria.

By joining Kurdish fighters in their battle against Islamic State, 28-year-old Ashley Johnston had broken Australian law.

He had also kept his plans from his family. The first time his mother heard that he was in Syria was the moment she learnt of his death.



"She wouldn't have supported him fighting there in any shape or form," a family spokesman told Fairfax Media. "She doesn't want anyone to go over there, no matter which side they are on."

But Australia's Kurdish community has nothing but adulation for the former postman, barman and keen Army Reservist who died when the Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG) tank he was travelling in was surrounded by IS forces near Tal Hamis in Hasakeh province on February 24.

The Queenslander, who lived in the ACT, is believed to be the first Westerner to die in battle against IS.




Over 300 Kurds farewelled the man they hail as a martyr, a hero and an exceptional fighter at a funeral service in Macquarie Park, Sydney, on Thursday morning.

His coffin, draped in the Australian and Kurdistan Democratic Union (PYD) party flags, was carried by men and women dressed in khaki fatigues and scarves in PYD colours of red, yellow and green.

Arms raised, hands held in defiant peace symbols, the crowd of men, women and children cheered and shouted.

"Shehid namaram" – martyrs never die – they chanted, as women ululated, tears streaming down their faces.

They might not have known him in person, but the man they called Heval Bagok Serhed and Comrade Ashley is the Australian brother the Kurds will never forget.

"Ashley is the symbol of why the Kurds love Australia and the Australians," said the Kurdish Association of Victoria's Rosa Bali.

But while she praised Johnston as a "hope of humanity" she berated the law, urging Australians to abolish an act that punishes those who "are morally justifiable but legally wrong".

Tara Fatehi of the Kurdish Association of Adelaide said Mr Johnston was a giant in their world.

"The Kurds have always had a saying that we have no friends but our mountains," she said through tears. "Ashley, you proved that centuries-old saying wrong."

Amanda Johnston, who spoke on behalf of a small number of family members in attendance, including Mr Johnston's sister, said her son put his life on the line for what is good and just.

"He saw a wrong in the world and did what he thought was right and helped with what he had in that moment," she said, receiving a standing ovation from the mourners.

A message of support came from the parents of British fighter Konstandinos Erik Scurfield, a former Royal Marine who was killed a few days after Johnston fighting IS with the YPG and whose body was returned to Britain last week.

With Kurdish community leaders from across Australia vowing to never forget the "selfless act" of a man who "embodied Australian values" and stood against IS, Johnston's death raises questions as to how the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Attorney-General's office deal with the fatalities of Australian fighters in the Middle East.

Fighting for the YPG is an Australian offence, punishable by up to 20 years in jail. DFAT has urged all Australians fighting IS in the Middle East to return home.

The Johnston family will hold a private burial in Canberra. They are yet to learn how Mr Johnston made connections with the Kurdish community and came to be fighting for the YPG, though it is believed a Facebook group may have played a part and that he had been fighting with YPG since December.

His body left Syria via a border crossing into Turkey that has since closed. Fairfax Media has sought comment from DFAT.

A Bad Week for Syria’s Military As Its Troops Collapse o Two Fronts
April 2, 2015

Bruising Week for Syria’s Assad as Troops Suffer Losses

Associated Press

April 2, 2015

BEIRUT — It was a bruising week for Syria’s Bashar Assad. The rapid collapse of his forces on two fronts in the north and south brought the opposition its biggest victories in two years, raising serious questions about the president’s ability to fend off increasingly sophisticated rebel campaigns.

After losing the capital of Idlib province in northwestern Syria this week, government forces on Thursday lost major ground in the south, where rebels captured the only functioning border crossing with Jordan, a crucial gateway for Syria’s government.

For some observers, the successive losses represent a shift in Syria’s four-year civil war — suggesting Assad’s forces were overstretched and pointing to a new unity and assertiveness by opposition forces, which had long been plagued by divisions.

The opposition drive is being led largely by al-Qaida’s branch in Syria, the Nusra Front. The group has long been among the strongest opposition forces, and in the recent moves it has shown greater coordination with other rebel factions. All told, the Nusra Front and its rival, the Islamic State group, now control roughly half of Syria, raising concerns about the country’s future.

On Wednesday, Islamic State militants made their deepest foray yet toward Damascus, briefly seizing parts of a Palestinian refugee camp on the edge of the Syrian capital.

While they do not yet threaten Assad’s hold on power, the rebel gains are likely to raise further questions among frustrated supporters about his ability to end the war.

"The apparent collapse of government defenses in Idlib has punched a gaping hole in the government’s narrative of approaching victory and boosted the opposition politically as well as militarily, spelling trouble for Bashar Assad," wrote Syria expert Aron Lund in an article published on the Syria Comment blog.

On Thursday, plumes of smoke billowed from the Syrian side of the border with Jordan, as Syrian warplanes and helicopters bombed the areas, trying to slow down the advances by rebels who seized the Nasib border crossing.

Nasib is an important route for Damascus to get essentials and for merchants and businessmen as a way to export to the Gulf. A prolonged closure will increase the stranglehold on an economy ravaged by four years of war. Last week, rebels captured the strategic nearby town of Busra Sham, posing in front of its historic citadel and Roman theater in another punch to government supporters.

The biggest blow to the government however, came from the north with the rebel capture of the city of Idlib last weekend after a four-day assault.

The government had held the mainly Sunni city since Syria’s conflict began four years ago even as most of the surrounding countryside fell into rebel hands. Damascus had often boasted of keeping hold of all the provincial capitals with the exception of Raqqa, in the east, which fell in 2013 and is now the de facto capital of the Islamic State group.

The Idlib attack was led by a coalition of rebel forces led by Nusra, along with the hard-line Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa groups, believed to be largely backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In an audio statement Wednesday, Nusra’s leader Abu Muhammed al-Golani said Idlib would be ruled by Islamic Shariah law but vowed that his group would not seek to monopolize power in the city, urging rebels to remain united.

According to some activists, the groups have received an infusion of new weapons and logistical support meant to pressure Assad and his Iranian backers as part of the Sunni-Shiite proxy war playing out in the region, with Yemen as its latest arena.
"There is no question that we live in an interactive region," said Hilal Khashan, political science professor at the American University of Beirut, adding that the Saudis were pushing via Jordan for the rebel offensive in southern Syria.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said Tuesday that Arabs and other states should work to establish “a military balance on the ground to force the butcher of Damascus to respond to a peaceful solution at a time he is insisting on military victory.”

In the Idlib offensive, the Syrian government accused Turkey of opening the way for thousands of rebels to reach the battle zone.

An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 rebels are believed to have taken part in the attack under a unified command known as Jaysh al-Fateh, or Conquest Army, storming the city from three sides. They were supported by heavy weaponry seized from defeated government forces and reportedly used U.S.-made advanced TOW missiles seized from moderate rebels in earlier clashes.

Pro-government media said Turkish forces jammed Syrian army telecommunication systems in Idlib, contributing to the collapse in defenses.

Within four days, the militants were in control of the city of 165,000 people, as thousands of its residents fled for safety in government-held areas.

"It was a real war," said a pro-government Sunni resident who fled shortly before Idlib fell. He described hundreds of "bearded men" — a reference to Islamic militants — arriving in the city.

"I left in the last moment when I realized my end will be death. We did not want to die this way," he said by phone, asking that his name not be made public for fear militants might harm relatives still in Idlib.

The fighters who moved in were organized and refrained from flagrant acts of provocation, though several residents reported that militants entered Idlib’s Saint Mary Orthodox church, made the Islamic call for prayers and detained and humiliated a local priest.

Strategically, the capture of Idlib helps open the way for rebels to put more pressure on government forces in the nearby province of Aleppo, as well as the coastal Latakia province that includes Assad’s hometown.

The rebel wins in part reflect the back-and-forth nature of the war from the start.

Still, it is definitely a change from not long ago when Assad’s forces had momentum and seemed unbeatable. The battle for Idlib also underscored how deeply the government relies on Shiite militiamen and Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas. They were not present in the battle to back up Assad’s forces in the city.

"The battle was an important test of the regime’s ability to execute its military strategy, and the test failed," wrote Jeffrey White, an analyst with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

A Middle East-based Western diplomat said Assad is being challenged internally by growing dissatisfaction among the government’s own support groups because of his unwillingness to enter into a political settlement, the downward economic situation and high death toll, particularly among his own Alawite constituency.

Still, the diplomat said there is nothing to suggest that would shake the government’s “either us or nothing” line when it comes to a political settlement. He spoke on condition of anonymity as he wasn’t authorized to brief journalists.

Lund said Assad’s forces have been taken down a notch.

"It seems that Assad is still trying to bite off more of Syria than he can swallow," he wrote. The Idlib defeat "underlines how dangerously overstretched his regime has become."