Mi smo u firmi dobili prosle godine jednog kolegu iz Doboja. Iz nekog sela Šije, tako nesto. Dakle Muslimana...
On nije pojma imao da ako odvojis slavinu od cijevi, da ce nastati poplava zbog pritiska, a kao on je mehanicar. "Bio šef u Volksvagenu kaze". Dodje on do nas i nosi slavinu i metar crijeva. A na sljepocnici mu se vidi komad teflona i crvenilo na koži. Izgleda da ga opizdila slavina kad ju je odvrnuo sa cijevi po glavi. I nista, on do nas i onako kao da nista nije bilo kaze: "to vi malo pritegnite, da voda ne ide, a ja idem po novu slavinu". A mi u cudu Bokte, sto ovaj radi. Ja kazem "sto posto on doma nema vodu u kuci, nego ima onu pumpu u vrtu koju se pumpa". Na kraju je prizano jednom kolegi da ima to u dvoristu. Boze sacuvaj. A da o njegovom ponasanju ne govorim. Od svih se izolirao prvog dana. Sa nikim nece da prica. Kad mu kazes i ides nesto pokazivati sto bi trebao raditi, on se naljuti... Sam sjedi po cijelu noc na katu u tvornici, a da sef smjene nezna po 3 dana jel ovaj dosao na posao. Nece dolje medju ljude... Nikome broj telefona nije htio dati. Totalno ludilo. Da ne pricam kad smo ga jednom ipak dovukli da sa nama jede merenu, imali smo gradele. Da ce on oprati sudje. Ja do njega, a on u hladonj vodi pere tanjure i pinjure bez spuzve i bez ćarlija. Kazem mu u vreucu vodu to operi i odi po spuzvu i carli... Da ne treba carli, spuzva i topla voda. Jos je placeniji od mene. A ja rintam i za njega. Ne mogu ga naci u tvornici jer se sakrije. A stanuje u kuci kod direktora i tako on opstaje na poslu. Otisao sam malo u off ali kad vec spominjete njihov karakter, eto i moje iskustvo.

Slijepci ih prevode preko ceste. Najlakše se orjentišu.

Na Klixu svjedoci pišu da je danas zrak toliko zagađen i mutan da vrane hodaju po zemlji.

Koji je to posal.
Ja cuo od ljudi da se nemozes sakrivat u njemackoj.Da oni pregledaju na kraju dana ko je sta radio?

Od svog tog silnog novca, ogromnog morala, želje za osvetom, sigurnih ruta za oružje, demoraliziranog protivnika mogli ste si barem osloboditi glavni grad iz okruženja dok maštate o Banja Luci i potpunom srpskom porazu u BiH...

A ne da Hrvati vraćaju Srbima teritorij da bi muslimani dobili Sarajevo.

...
Još nešto niko i nije očekivao da vi oslobodite Banja Luku. Armija je mogla sama slomiti VRS da se rat nastavio, jedino uz pomoć Srbije ovi su se mogli održati. Uostalom cijeli rat Srbija ih je držala u svakom smislu.

Radi se o RH. Posal je da opere jedan stroj svakih 2h. Odnosno 4x u smjeni. Nije tesko, ali smjene umore covjeka i tako. Nezna se niti tko je vlasnik, a tamosnji direktori ni krivi nit duzni... kao da je njihova firma. Kazem, moze svih taj mali iz Šija tako vuci za nos, jer zivi kod direktora doma. Direktoru je u interesu napuniti punu kuci Muslimanima i sam sebi placati smjestaj. Bilo ih je jos 3. Ali su otpali jer nisu bili sposobni nista raditi. Samo spavati, mada su imali placu 3-4x vecu nego kod kuce. Na poslu se niti ne radi nezna koliko... ali nisu u stanju bili niti to izvrsavati. Ili su oni svi takvi ili je nama dosao zadnji sljam.

Kako to da se ugljen može kupiti na veliko u slobodnoj prodaji?? Ja nisam vidio komade ugljena već 20+ godina.

Mislim da je to u RH ilegalno, nit se može kupiti, osim u vrećama za roštilj.. Ako se grije na kruto, onda je to drvo.

Ne zajebavam se, ali mislim da se ugljen ne može kupiti u Hrvatskoj..

Radi se o RH. Posal je da opere jedan stroj svakih 2h. Odnosno 4x u smjeni. Nije tesko, ali smjene umore covjeka i tako. Nezna se niti tko je vlasnik, a tamosnji direktori ni krivi nit duzni... kao da je njihova firma. Kazem, moze svih taj mali iz Šija tako vuci za nos, jer zivi kod direktora doma. Direktoru je u interesu napuniti punu kuci Muslimanima i sam sebi placati smjestaj. Bilo ih je jos 3. Ali su otpali jer nisu bili sposobni nista raditi. Samo spavati, mada su imali placu 3-4x vecu nego kod kuce. Na poslu se niti ne radi nezna koliko... ali nisu u stanju bili niti to izvrsavati. Ili su oni svi takvi ili je nama dosao zadnji sljam.

Oslobodili smo nekoliko općina u Krajini za kratak period jer nas više nisu napadali sa 3 strane. Oslobodili bi i Sarajevo da se nastavilo.

Oslobodili smo nekoliko općina u Krajini za kratak period jer nas više nisu napadali sa 3 strane. Oslobodili bi i Sarajevo da se nastavilo. Kad je Ozren oslobođen a vidim da budale ovdje pišu kako su Arapi donijeli pobjedu što očigledno pokazuje da veze nemaju. Puno ranije sve ključne kote su zauzeli Crni Labudovi i onemogućili lakšu odbranu Srbima, dalje na sam dan oslobađanja artiljerija je djelovala satima, ranije je to bilo nezamislivo jer nismo imali čime napadati. Onda se krenulo u čišćenje i jedan pravac su imali Arapi koji su to uzeli u 10-15 minuta.
Ovo će vam i Srbi koji su bili u ratu na Ozrenu potvrditi.
Dakle prestanite srati kako su Arapi donijeli pobjedu i kako je to jedina pobjeda Armije u ratu.
Ruta snadbijevanja se tek uhodala i rat je zaustavljen. Pred kraj smo bili jako dobro naoružani zato je Alija i molio da se nastavi, ali se moglo još naoružati.
Još nešto niko i nije očekivao da vi oslobodite Banja Luku. Armija je mogla sama slomiti VRS da se rat nastavio, jedino uz pomoć Srbije ovi su se mogli održati. Uostalom cijeli rat Srbija ih je držala u svakom smislu.

Još nešto niko i nije očekivao da vi oslobodite Banja Luku. Armija je mogla sama slomiti VRS da se rat nastavio, jedino uz pomoć Srbije ovi su se mogli održati. Uostalom cijeli rat Srbija ih je držala u svakom smislu.

"One of the most discussed hypothetical questions of the final campaign is whether the HV could have taken Banja Luka. The answer is a heavily qualified "probably", the main qualifier being timing. An HV dash for Banja Luka soon after the completion of "Maestral" probably would have got to the city quickly or forced the VRS to divert all of the reserves it was sending to Prijedor instead to Banja Luka, in which case the 5th Corps could have taken Prijedor. The same holds true for "Juzni Potez" in that, the more quickly the HV moved, the less time the VRS would have had to prepare. On the other hand, if the VRS had been given time to transfer more units after "Juzni Potez," Banja Luka most likely would have proved a difficult nut for even the HV to crack. In the immediate aftermath of Mrkonjic Grad's fall, the VRS had already shifted the veteran 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade -- probably best brigade in the RS -- to Manjaca. 835 If the VRS believed an HV operation against Banja Luka was imminent, the Main Staff would most likely have transferred all available reserves to the Manjaca area, building up a force that could have numbered at least nine and maybe 11 brigades, including a full-armored brigade, with upward of 15,000 to 20,000 troops. 836 The VRS would have verly likely fought even harder for Banja Luka than the SVK did at Knin, for they would not have been encircled. Such a large-scale movement of reserves, however, would have left the VRS vulnerable to attacks elsewhere, particularly around Doboj and -- depending on whether the HV/HVO wanted it -- in the Posavina area opposite Orasje."

Evaluations of the Forces at the End of the War

How had the armies performed during the last battles in Bosnia's Wild West?

All three forces (considering the HV/HVO as a single military force) had amply demonstrated their strengths and weaknesses during a full month of
some of the most intense combat of the war.

The Croatian Army had again established its position as the premier military organization in the Balkans. The HV's strengths included excellent staff planning, its employment of professional shock bri gades, and the ability to support its elite infantry with strong artillery fire and air support. The HV had developed a true combined arms capability in which picked infantry units backed by armor and artillery could fight their way through tough defenses and then rapidly exploit their breakthrough to the final objective.

These traits made the HV almost impossible to stop.

The weak spots in any HV campaign remained the Home Defense and reserve formations, most of which had little offensive punch and were no match for the majority of VRS units.

As for the ARBiH, it is true that the HV provided the main impetus in defeating the VRS, but the Bosnian Army played a key role in these operations as well. ARBiH operations throughout the country kept VRS units tied down and made it difficult to shift reserves to halt the HV's attacks. General Dudakovic was not wholly reliant on Croatian attacks to ease the way forARBiH advances, even though analysts have argued that the 5th Corps was able to break out from the Grabez plateau on 13 September only because of a coordinated VRS withdrawal made necessary by the successof "Maestral." On the contrary, it is clear that the 5th Corps defeated the 2nd Krajina Corps at Grabez on its own and that the VRS had no intention of pulling out of the area and was still holding out in Drvar againstthe HV the day of the ARBiH's successful attack. It was the arrival of the 5th Corps at Petrovac that aided the HV attack rather than the other way around. The 5th Corps won its unique victory because of the moral and tactical ascendancy that its elite infantry units had established over the VRS forces during three years of hard fighting on the Grabez plateau.

Time and again Dudakovic's forces had demoralized the Serb defenders with sophisticated diversion and infiltration tactics, and they were no longer able to resist them. What kept the ARBiH from triumphing over the VRS in other situations was its persistent weaknesses in heavy weaponry, which made it vulnerable to the VRS's strengths in armor, artillery, and solid staff work. The effects of this mismatch in capabilities were fully demonstrated during the late September-early October VRS counterstrikes and exacerbated in the open warfare of the last campaign. In those battles, ARBiH troops had to fight offensively, unprotected by fortifications, against VRS units that did not have the same fear of the ARBiH infantry that had been impressed upon the 2nd Krajina Corps troops. The 5th Corps' final capture of Sanski Most was, in fact, something of a fluke because the VRS had placed its luckless Grabez units opposite their most feared opponents.

The ARBiH commanders-particularly Generals Delic and Dudakovic-firmly believed that they could have quickly gained substantially more ground from the VRS around Prijedor and Banja Luka after the victory of Sanski Most. In this belief they are probably overrating their capabilities against VRS forces that had regrouped and regained their footing between Sanski Most and Prijedor. In most of the VRS-ARBiH combat following the 15 September 5th Corps break out from Bihac, the VRS had held the upper hand. Even after the ARBiH captured Sanski Most, the VRS was able to halt the 5th Corps drive on Prijedor. It therefore seems unlikely that the 5th Corps, even reinforced by units from 7th Corps and other formations, could have beaten the 1st Krajina Corps without the help of anew HV operation directed at Banja Luka.

The Bosnian Serb Army, denigrated throughout the war as armed thugs good only at slaughtering civilians, proved in the last months of its existence that it could still fight hard against a Croatian Army that clearly overmatched its military capabilities.

Analysis of the latter-day war operations refutes many claims and rumors that the VRS voluntarily withdrew from its positions in western Bosnia rather than being forced from the region by the HV /HVO and ARBiH. In the first place, the VRS had firmly maintained no withdrawals would be made, even from territory not required by the Serbs, until after a cease-was signed; then, if territory had to be given up, the population could depart in an orderly way. In keeping with this position, the VRS everywhere stood up to the initial attacks made on it but proved unable to stem the flood of the Croat-Muslim tide.

Against the HV, its fatal flaw almost predictably proved to be the lack of adequate corps-level reserves to seal breaches in VRS lines. Generally the VRS appears to have been able to hold the HV for about a day in its forward defenses before the HV was able to chew through its positions.

Because it had virtually no reserve brigades in western Bosnia and because its positions there generally consisted only of a single defensive zone no more than 5 to 10 kilometers deep, the VRS was unable to mount the counterattacks by which it had maintained these positions against the ARBiH.

In fighting the HV/HVO, VRS units were faced for the first time with an opponent that not only matched but also exceeded their own firepower in armor and artillery while also outnumbering them in manpower. Finally, what tipped the balance, even when the offense/defense ratio favored the VRS, was the HV/HVO's elite shock infantry brigades. The VRS could defeat Croatian reserve units. The well-trained, doggedly persistent Guards were another matter.

The VRS generals, Mladic and Milovanovic, and the VRS Main Staff displayed to the end their prowess at engneering strategic shifts of their limited formations. The move of seven major formations from halfway across the country despite heavy damage to its command and control structure during the NATO air campaign was a triumph of the VRS Main Staff's professionalism and skill. The Serbs' rapid execution of major counterattacks also showed how powerful the VRS remained at the end of the 'war, particularly against the ARBiH. In his last campaign, however, the western Bosnia theater commander, General Milovanovic, appears to have made some initial errors in his force dispositions that cost the VRS dearly. His forces were split too evenly among the Donji Vakuf, Glamoc-Drvar, and Grabez sectors, rather than concentrated in what the VRS considered a vital sector.

Given that the HV was the main threat, he should have either concentrated more troops opposite the Glamoc- Drvar area sooner or sent in his reserves before the enemy breakthrough. The VRS Main Staff, too, either did not recognize how brittle the 2nd Krajina Corps had become or was unable to do anything about it; General Tomanic's command appears to have been through the wringer one too many times and collapsed fatally on the Grabez under yet another 5th Corps attack. In all, the VRS simply faced too many competing priorities throughout Bosnia so that the Main Staff could no longer focus its forces on one theater.

One of the most discussed hypothetical questions of the final campaign is whether the HV could have taken Banja Luka. The answer is a heavily qualified "probably," the main qualifier being timing. An HV dash for Banja Luka soon after the completion of "Maestral" probably would have got to the city quickly or forced the VRS to divert all of the reserves it was sending to Prijedor instead to Banja Luka, in which case the 5th Corps could have taken Prijedor. The same holds true for "Juzni Potez" in that, the more quickly the HV moved, the less time the VRS would have had to prepare. On the other hand, if the VRS had been given time to transfer more units after "Juzni Potez," Banja Luka most likely would have proved a difficult nut for even the HV to crack. In the immediate aftermath of Mrkonjic Grad's fall, the VRS had already shifted the veteran 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade-probably the best brigade in the VRS-to Manjaca.83S If the VRS believed an HV operation against Banja Luka was imminent, the Main Staff would most likely have transferred all available reserves to the Manjaca area, building up a force that could have numbered at least nine and maybe 11 brigades, including a full-armored brigade, with upward of 15,000 to 20,000) troops.836 The VRS troops would very likely have fought' even harder for Banja Luka than the SVK did at Knin, for they would not have been encircled. Such a large-scale movement of reserves, however, would have left the VRS vulnerable to attacks elsewhere, particularly around Doboj and-depending on whether the HV /HVO wanted it in the Posavina area opposite Orasje.

Većina Muslimana su ustvari dosta dobri radnici. Ne znam kakvi su to došli kod tebe.

Kako da ne. Osvojili ste uz pomoć Hrvata, osvojili ste jer su Srbe napadale peteroduplo jače snage HV-a, HVO-a i NATO avijacija. Čim su HV i HVO stali, VRS vas je izbacila iz Ključa i zaprijetila da se vratite do Une. HVO i HRHB su reagirali i tu vas spasili.

Jedino ko je mogao uzeti Banja Luku su Hrvati, bez vas ili sa vama, svejedno. Vi niste sami mogli ni jednu zemunicu uzet.

Nema šanse da ste mogli uzeti Banjaluku .
Ni pojedinačno ,ni zajedno ..
Naravno ,dio banjalučana je dao petama vjetar,ništa čudno u tome,bježali bi i zagrepčani,kao što su bježali i Muslimani iz muslimanskog Sarajeva..Ali ostalo nas je sasvim dovoljno da je odbranimo ,a imali smo i čime.
Mogli ste joj nanijeti štetu ,ali bi vas to skupo koštalo.
Vjeruj nije šuplje srbovanje kad kažem da su te priče o mogućem padu BL mit koji veliku štetu nanosi muslimanskoj " dječurliji "u realnom sagledavanju mnogo čega.

Inače ste vjerodostojni pa vam vjerujemo...

Tu se možemo složiti jer i mene boli ona stvar za šuplje ili nešuplje srbovanje.

Samo mi je simpatično to "vjeruj mi" jer to isto koriste i muslimani na forumima, a ni mi ni vi im ne vjerujemo. S razlogom.