The opening salvo of the Bosnian Army's counteroffensive was to come at Travnik, almost exactly in the geographic and demographic center of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With a prewar population of over 70,000 (45% Muslim, 37% Croat, 11% Serb) it was (after Zenica) the second-largest town in central Bosnia. A few kilometers south of Travnik was the smaller town of Novi Travnik, with some 30,000 residents and a slightly higher percentage of Croats than Muslims.

The home of central Bosnia's largest Muslim population, the Travnik-Zenica urban area was becoming the center of a new, more assertive Bosnian Muslim identity. More radical and much more religious than the Bosnian Muslim population as a whole, the "new" Travnik Muslims were starting to attract a dedicated following. The new, hardline attitude was most visible in the large refugee population that had been expelled from Jajce, Donji Vakuf, and large swathes of western Bosnia. Their radicalization had begun with the atrocities they suffered at the Serb hands during the ethnic cleansing of 1992, and attitudes became all the more extreme after Bosnia's Muslims were attacked by Croats in April-May 1993.

From a military standpoint, there were two visible products of the hardening of the Bosnian attitude in the Travnik area: the 7th Muslimanska and 17th Krajina Brigades. Destined to become two of the most feared, famous, and accomplished units in the Bosnian Army, the 7th Muslimanska Brigade from Zenica and 17th Krajina Brigade from Travnik were zealous shock troops of Bosnia's displaced Muslims. Composed largely of Muslims "cleansed" out of other parts of Bosnia - young men with no place to go - the soldiers of these brigades made up in fierceness and enthusiasm what they lacked in training and discipline.

The Bosnian Army did not quite know how it felt about them or the increasing number of foreign Islamic volunteers who came to join their ranks. On the one hand, they could be unruly and problematic, harassing local Bosnian Croats and even insufficiently religious Bosnian Muslims. On the other hand there was no question that these troops were highly motivated and efective fighters. Sorely in need of willing and able assault troops, the Bosnian Army began in June 1993 to use these units as spearheads for its attacks.

At the outset, both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croats had substantial forces available for combat in the Travnik - Novi Travnik area. Although the Croats may have had a slight edge in terms of organization and equipment, the two forces were on the whole comparably armed. Other factors being about equal, the Bosnian Army's local advantage in manpower was to prove decisive.

All of the Bosnian Government's forces in the area belonged to the ARBiH 3rd Corps and its Bosanska Krajina Operational Group under the command of Enver Hadzihasanovic and Mehmed Alagic, respectively. The core would be the 17th Krajina Brigade, commanded by Fikret Cuskic and headquartered in Travnik itself. In addition to the 17th Krajina, the ARBiH could call upon the 306th Mountain Brigade, headquartered in the nearby Travnik suburb of Han Bila, and if necessary the 7th Muslimanska, 303rd, and 314th Brigades from Zenica. When the Bosnian Muslims launched their attack, they probably had the equivalent of at least four full brigades to commit to the fight.

HVO forces in the area comprised most of the Central Bosnian Operation Zone's First Operational Group. Two HVO brigades were from Travnik, the "Travnicka" brigade and the "Frankopan" Brigade. Another, the "Stjepan Tomasevic" brigade, had a batallion in nearby Novi Travnik. Although the First Operational Group (OG's) other assets - the "Vitez" Brigade, the other batalion of the "Stjepan Tomasevic" Brigade, and the remnants of the defeated "Jure Francetic" Brigade, all located in Vitez - could in theory have reinforced the Travnik HVO, as events unfolded the HVO's other resources proved too far away and too preoccupied with the events in Vitez area to be of any assistance. The HVO, therefore, had roughly two brigades available for the defense of Travnik.

The Croat-Muslim frontline with the Bosnian Serbs ran 2 or 3 kilometers to the northwest of Travnik. The Serbs were in excellent geographical position, having occupied the massive Mt. Vlasic feature situated just north of Travnik and overlooking the entire town and its environs. During the Croat-Muslim conflict in this area, however, the Serbs were content to watch their opponents fight it out and did not involve themselves beyond the occasional shelling.

The Bosnian Muslims kicked off their attack on 4 June with fierce infantry clashes inside Travnik town. Street battles were accompanied by mortar and artillery fire, while levelled antiaircraft guns were used to clear out houses. By 5 June the HVO had largely vacated Travnik itself but continued to shell the area from Croat-held villages in the suburbs overlooking the twon center. Two cease-fire agreements were announced on 5 and 6 June, but fighting continued unabated.

By the end of the day on 6 June, the Bosnian Croats were unquestionably on the run. Bosnian Serb military spokesmen stated on 7 June that about 5,000 Bosnian Croats - including over 1,000 HVO troops - had surrendered to the Bosnian Serb forces west of Travnik to escape the Croat-Muslim fighting of the previous few days. The Bosnian Croats initially dismissed the claim as propaganda but later admitted that the HVO troops had disobeyed orders to fight their way through to other Croat-held positions and had instead given themselves up to the Serbs. Thousands more Bosnian Croat civilians fled up the slopes of Serb-held Mt. Vlasic (in dreadful weather) to surrender to the Serbs over the next few days, after Muslim forces cut off all escape routes.

A barely perceptible lull occured on 8 June when the Bosnian Army's new commander in chief, Gen. Rasim Delic, called for a halt in the fighting and accepted a Croat-Muslim cease-fire agreement effective for the whole country. Having gained the initiative, however, the Bosnian Army pressed its advantage as far as it could in all directions and on 8 and 9 June continued its offensive to the southeast, attacking the nearby village of Senkovci and pushing the remaining HVO forces south and east toward Croat-held Novi Travnik and Vitez. Government forces also made important gains to the west, seizing the key road junction at Turbe. Lastly, the ARBiH opened a new offensive axis to the east, successfully clearing a government-controlled corridor all the way from, Travnik to Zenica, some 20 km away.

The Fall of Travnik


The expected resumption of the Muslim offensive came at the end of the first week of June, when elements of eight ABiH brigades struck the HVO forces manning the defensive line against the Bosnian Serb Army in the Travnik area. The Muslim attack achieved tactical surprise and was completely successful, capturing the HVO positions and driving the surviving HVO soldiers and thousands of terrified Croat civilians into the hands of the Serbs, who took them prisoner. 2

Tensions between Muslims and Croats had been building in the Travnik area since January. Between January and April, the ABiH packed troops into the Thavnik area using buses from Zenica traveling via Guca Gora to minimize observation by the HVO. The buses allegedly were engaged in rotating Mus.lim troops on the front lines against the Serbs, but Croat civilians frequently reported that buses were returning empty toward Zenica. Muslim troops and mujahideen from Zenica, Mehurici, and Milize were also hidden in Muslim villages in the area or in groups of two or three in Muslim houses in Croat villages. By April, the ABiH forces in the Travnik area totaled some 8,000-10,000 men under Mehmed Alagic, commander of the ABiH III Corps's OG Bosanska-Krajina (soon to be redesignated the ABiH VII Corps). The ABiH forces in the Travnik area included the 312th Mountain Brigade (about 3,300 men; commanded by Zijad Gaber); the 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade (about 3,300 men; commanded by Fikret Cuskic); the 27th Krajina Mountain Brigade (about 2,100 men; commanded by Rasim Imamovic); the 3d Battalion, 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade (about 900 men); the 1st Battalion, 308th Mountain Brigade; elements of the 325th Mountain Brigade and of the 37th Krajina Mountain Brigade; the "EI Mudzahid" Detachment of mujahideen (about 400 men); some 800 men of the RBiH Ministry of the Interior Police; and two special purpose units: "Mercici" and "Nanetovi," each with around 60-80 men. The town itself and the surrounding area was also packed with some 15,000 Muslim refugees, many of whom were armed. 3

In early April, prior to the Muslim offensive against Vitez, Busovaca, and Kiseljak, the ABiH fed even more reinforcements into the Travnik area. For example, on April 15, an HVO checkpoint near the town stopped an ABiH convoy of three buses, six trucks, and thirteen other vehicles loaded with troops. The Muslim convoy attempted to pass through the HVO lines three times before it was finally permitted to go through to the barracks in Travnik. On June 5, immediately before the ABiH offensive against Travnik began, the Muslim forces in Travnik were reinforced by an additional eight hundred men.

From January to April, the HVO forces manning the defense lines against the BSA in the immediate Travnik area consisted of the Travnicka Brigade, commanded by Filip Filipovic, with all three of its battalions. On April 1, a second brigade-the Frankopan Brigade-was formed under the command of Ilija Nakic, and from that point onward there were five battalions in the sector. In all, there were some twenty-five hundred to three thousand HVO soldiers on the defense lines in April, many of whom were rotated in from other areas in the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica region. The HVO headquarters on the Travnik front was situated above the town of Travnik in the village of Jankovici.

On June I, the defensive lines facing the BSA in the Travnik area were held in part by the ABiH and in part by the HVO, with the HVO holding about two-thirds of the total line.4 The responsibility for the HVO portion of the line was divided among the HVO Novi Travnik (Tomasevic Brigade, Zeljko Sabljic commanding), HVO Travnik (Travnicka Brigade, Jozo Leutar commanding), and the Frankopan Brigade (llija Nakic commanding). The Tomasevic Brigade held from "Sweetwater" (near BM 1182) south- west to BM 986 near the village of Petkovici, at which point the ABiH continued the line south toward Donja Vakuf and Bugojno. The Travnicka Brigade was responsible for the line from Sweetwater northwest to Kazici (a ground distance of about four and one-half kilometers), where the ABiH took up a short section of about two kilometers running northwest to Giganic. The Travnicka Brigade took over there and continued the defensive line around the Turbe salient and then east to the vicinity of BM 1109. The Frankopan Brigade, headquartered at Dolac, took up the line at BM 1109 and extended it around the Vlasic plateau and then north to the Vlaska-gromila area (near BM 1919), where the ABiH assumed responsibility. The ABiH controlled Travnik, although the HVO maintained a headquarters and other facilities in the town. Muslim roadblocks at Ran Bila and at the entry to Travnik near the mosque at a place called "Bluewater" controlled entry into the town itself.

On June 6, the commander of the British UNPROFOR battalion in the Lasva Valley met with Enver Radzihasanovic, the ABiH III Corps commander, to discuss the growing problems in the Travnik area. Hadzihasanovic, taking a hard line, remarked that the Muslims were left little alternative but military action in what had become "an outright civil war." After the meeting, British UNPROFOR authorities reported, "the BiH were no longer prepared to restrain themselves, and were likely to take the military initiative in the Lasva Valley." A second meeting was scheduled for the same day with Colonel Blaskic, the OZCB commander, but Hadzihasanovic refused to attend because he thought it was "too late for negotiation." The BRlTBAT intelligence analyst noted that the "Corps, judging by the attitude of its commander, seems poised for further military action having clearly rejected the concept of negotiation."5 Indeed, the ABiH was poised for further military action.

Without prior warning, Muslim troops commanded by Mehmed Alagic struck their erstwhile ally on June 6, 1993. Within seventy-two hours, the heavily outnumbered HVO forces in Travnik surrendered or were driven over the Serb lines.6The 303d Mountain Brigade attacked via Ovnak toward Guca Gora, while the 306th Light Brigade attacked in the direction of Pokrajcici. The 312th Mountain Brigade, the 17th and 27th Krajina Mountain Brigades, and the 3d Battalion, 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade, launched attacks directly into the rear of the HVO units holding the front lines against the Serbs. Muslim Ministry of the Interior Police surrounded the "Star" headquarters in Travnik and isolated it. The fiercest attacks, which came on June 8, resulted in twenty-four HVO soldiers and sixty-eight Croat civilians killed. Unable to sustain the house-to-house fighting and unable to obtain reinforcements or resupply, the HVO forces in and around Travnik broke and fled into the Serb lines accompanied by several thousand Croat civilians. On June 10, the new overall ABiH commander, Rasim Delic, ordered his troops to halt their advance.

Having secured the town of Travnik and driven the HVO soldiers from their positions facing the Serbs, the ABiH began systematically clearing the Croat villages northeast of Travnik in order to secure their line of communications to Zenica. At 3 A.M. on June 7, the ABiH attacked elements of the Frankopan Brigade holding the villages of Grahovici, Brajkovici, Plavici, Guca Gora, and Bukovica in an attempt to seize control of the road from Zenica to Travnik. As the HVO units blocking the roads withdrew, the Croat villages fell one by one into the hands of Muslim extremists who engaged in a program of very thorough ethnic cleansing. By June 14, the Zenica-Travnik road via Guca Gora was firmly in ABiH hands. According to contemporary newspaper accounts, Croatian radio reported some thirty-two Croat villages had been cleansed, among which UN sources identified Brajkovici, Grahovici, Bukovica, Radojcici, and Maljine. The story of the village of Guca Gora and its famous Catholic monastery was perhaps typical. Muslim extremists, who had been hiding in nearby Muslim homes, seized the village and desecrated the church in the Franciscan monastery. They carried away the religious statuary and murdered the HVO defenders, several civilians in the monastery, and eight village guard sentinels. British UNPROFOR troops, having observed Muslim troops firing machine guns at Croat civilians fleeing into the woods, prevented an even greater tragedy by rescuing more than 180 Croats trapped in the monastery.7

Croatian radio reported more than 250 dead in the Travnik region, as well as some fifteen thousand Croatian refugees following the June 6-10 attack. According to one contemporary newspaper account, there was "strong evidence of atrocities" as Muslim forces attempted to seize the back roads northeast of Travnik leading to Zenica. By June 9, some 8,000 HVO soldiers and Croat civilians had crossed into the Serb lines on the Vlasic massif, and 1,000 of the HVO soldiers were disarmed and taken by the Serbs to the "notorious Manjaca camp." United Nations sources reported that as of June 10, 500 Croats had been killed, thirty-eight villages had been burned, and some 30,000 displaced persons were in the Novi Bila-Vitez- Busovaca-Novi Travnik area.8 Overall, in June, July, and August, some 427 HVO soldiers and 157 Croat civilians were killed, 1,000 were wounded, 20,000 Croat civilians were displaced, fifteen hundred Croat homes and thirty-one hundred other buildings were burned, and about fifty Croat villages between Travnik and Zenica were destroyed, including Grahovcici, Donja Maljina, Guca Gora, Bikosi, Sadici, Goillja Puticevo, Rudnik, Bila, and Cupa.

Although the Muslim forces had already launched two other major at- tacks since the beginning of 1993, one contemporary newspaper account noted on June 9: "The fighting reflected a possible new Muslim tactic. With attempts to regain territory from rebel Serbs failing, Muslim-led government troops appear to be trying to wrest territory from the Croats. 'I believe that a general (Muslim) offensive is under way,' said Col. Alastair Duncan, commander of British soldiers serving with the UN peacekeeping forces."9

Another contemporary newspaper account noted: "The offensive apparently was prompted by a desperate desire by Muslims for land and revenge after months of defeats by Bosnian Serbs and humiliation by Bosnian Croats. ...By capturing Travnik, Muslim-led forces moved closer to linking their strongholds of Tuzla and Zenica to the north with Muslim-controlled Konjic in the south."
Even the ECMM was forced to admit that the ABiH had indeed undertaken a military offensive against the HVO and Bosnian Croat civilians in the Travnik and Lasva Valley areas.10

Jedna od najveći boljki HVO-a je neorganiziranost ali jedna možda jednako velika njoj je slaba ili nikakava kordinacija..

Primjer; Za čitavog sukoba sa muslimanima smo jednostavno prepustili da nam muslimani diktiraju tempo sukoba; kada, kako i gdje napasti i voditi sukobe, e sad donekle to mogu razumiti u SB ali samo donekle, priča o malobrojnosti i slične priće HVO- OZ SB. Mislim da ta priča za ostala područja ne prolazi, HVO od Rame do Neuma i od Mostara do Livna je trebao imati minimalno 40 000 bojovnika, besprjekornu logističku potporu, dobar manevarski prostor i sl.. e sad to pruža dobar temelj da situacija ne bude tako složena kako kažete da je bila...
Uvesti neki veliki red u gradovima gdje skorom po središtu grada ide crta bojišnice je teško ili nemoguče ali u općinama koje su nekih 100 KM od najbliže crte mislim da nije nemoguča misija..
Kordinacija je bila više nego loša, ovdje je svaki općinski HVO vodio neki svoj rat, Kod nas u TR je situacija bila skoro normalna sa ABiH dok je u Vitezu bio pravi rat... ili neko spomenu Bugojno i Uskoplje... još bolji primjer...
U takvim uvjetima se slažem da je teško imati rezervu i sl. snage e sad otkud takva situacija i što joj se nije stalo u kraj...

ma kakvih 40 000 vojnika od Livna do Mostara. Tu je živjelo nešto preko 200 000 ljudi a pošto je mobilizacijski minimum 10% populacije a 12% neki maksimum..tu je moglo biti brat bratu 20 000 vojnika i to papirnatih..

Cijeli HVo nije imao više od 40 000 vojnika, i to opet papirnatih.

ma kakvih 40 000 vojnika od Livna do Mostara. Tu je živjelo nešto preko 200 000 ljudi a pošto je mobilizacijski minimum 10% populacije a 12% neki maksimum..tu je moglo biti brat bratu 20 000 vojnika i to papirnatih..

Cijeli HVo nije imao više od 40 000 vojnika, i to opet papirnatih.

Potpis. Upravo tako piše gore, ali opet znam točno na šta misle i kako rezoniraju...ako je HVO u Lašvansko-Lepeničkoj dolini mogao računati na 8.000 vojnika, ljudi se pitaju zašto se od Livna do Neuma preko Mostara do Prozora nije moglo skupiti 5x toliko vojnika.

Drukčiji uvjeti, možda nam Mar-kan može napisati više o mobilizaciji i novačenju kod njih, kod njih je faktički mobilizacija bila 100% za sve od 18 do 65.

Bukvalno sve što je moglo hodati i nositi oružje...Znam čovjeka koji je bio i u WW2.

Ja znam recimo da je dio postrojbi iz Rame ostao u dolini nakon presijecanja veze prema Hercegovini. Bili su na Luški...
Pa treba dodat i Zeničane, Jajčane Hrvate.

Kad se sve zbroji u Srednjoj Bosni (cijeloj sa Žepčem i Varešom) je nekad živjelo više Hrvata nego u Hercegovini zajedno s Livnom.

A otprilike, na koliki se postotak moglo stvarno računat, a koliko ih je bilo samo upotrebljivo za straže i položaje oko svoje kuće, njive? Kako su raspoređivani ti iz drugog i trećeg ešalona, recimo taj djed?

Taj je djed bio u ustašama,ima zavidno iskustvo iz onog rata,gulio 7 godina teške robije.Odlazio je sam samcat u izviđanja,kroz minska polja i slušao armijaše kako razgovaraju u bunkerima.Jednom smo ga morali pokrivati vatrom da se izvuče,cuko ga neki otkrio i zalajao.Još je živ,pokretan,odlično se sjeća svega.Čak nam je pokazivao gdje mu je završio rafal iz 44. u gredi jedne kuće!

U biti,kad je sve ostalo u okruženju,nije bilo straže,sve je na crtu bačeno.Npr. preko noći smo bili blizu nekoj crti i spavali,a stariji su pazili u bunkerima.Zorom se ide na drugu crtu ako je trebalo odbiti neki napad ili nasilna izviđanja i sl.Onda opet preko dana ako se uspije sve završiti drijemanje.Interventne snage su uvijek bile negdje angažirane.U zadnjoj fazi sukoba djelovalo se i u parovima.Ljudi koji su bili rođeni od 1930. pa nadalje su imali okršaje sa npr. ID grupama!Domobranima je bilo najteže.Prvi udar je uvijek na njih,a nisu ih napadali domobrani iz armije.

U čitavom tom haosu je trebalo ustrojiti vojsku i opstati,nema ljudi,nema oružja,nema tko od časničkog-dočasničkog kadra...ma dobro smo mi ostali koliko toliko i normalni poslije svega.

E kad je u pitanju mobilizacija u SB to bi ja podijelio na dva dijela;
Jedan dio je 100 % onako kako je to Markan opisao ukratko sve pod oružje, i na crti skoro sve. Ali to je bilo več kad se nije imalo kud, ili što bi teoretičari rekli odsudna obrana...
Prvi dio rata nije takav ni u dolini... kafići rade, dok se u susjednoj općini ratuje, mobilizacija je više sličila na moljakanje ljudi po selu da se pomogne susjednom selu i sl... Ne mogu da se ne sjetim i ne spomenem one potvrde za prolazak ili izlazak iz doline i sl. stvari
Skoro cijelu Jajačku brigadu i dobar dio kotorvaroške bojne smo ispratili pogledima i skoro odahnuli kad su otišli iz doline... (samo manji dio je osto i branio dolinu) A značaj jajački muslimana u borbama za uskoplje je nemjerljiv i ne samo uskoplje...
Mislim da tek kad su nas zeleni pritiskli i to dobro došlo se do neke pameti pa se branilo i mobiliziralo kako treba...

Meni se čini malo da svi naši južni prostori nisu imali više od 20 000 vojnika... posebice ako to poredim sa lašvanskom dolinom gdje je vjerodostojan podatak od nekih minimum 8000 vojnika, znaći 4 naše općine, TR, NT, VI i BUS + izbjeglice ZE JC i sl.... Izgleda da to dole nije baš funkcioniralo ni blizu kako je trebalo..

E kad je u pitanju mobilizacija u SB to bi ja podijelio na dva dijela;
Jedan dio je 100 % onako kako je to Markan opisao ukratko sve pod oružje, i na crti skoro sve. Ali to je bilo več kad se nije imalo kud, ili što bi teoretičari rekli odsudna obrana...
Prvi dio rata nije takav ni u dolini... kafići rade, dok se u susjednoj općini ratuje, mobilizacija je više sličila na moljakanje ljudi po selu da se pomogne susjednom selu i sl... Ne mogu da se ne sjetim i ne spomenem one potvrde za prolazak ili izlazak iz doline i sl. stvari
Skoro cijelu Jajačku brigadu i dobar dio kotorvaroške bojne smo ispratili pogledima i skoro odahnuli kad su otišli iz doline... (samo manji dio je osto i branio dolinu) A značaj jajački muslimana u borbama za uskoplje je nemjerljiv i ne samo uskoplje...
Mislim da tek kad su nas zeleni pritiskli i to dobro došlo se do neke pameti pa se branilo i mobiliziralo kako treba...

Meni se čini malo da svi naši južni prostori nisu imali više od 20 000 vojnika... posebice ako to poredim sa lašvanskom dolinom gdje je vjerodostojan podatak od nekih minimum 8000 vojnika, znaći 4 naše općine, TR, NT, VI i BUS + izbjeglice ZE JC i sl.... Izgleda da to dole nije baš funkcioniralo ni blizu kako je trebalo..

Još veči paradoks da su bolnicu u gradu TR cijelo vrijeme dovoženi ranjeni muslimanski vojnici ranjeni npr za vrijeme prvog ili drugog sukoba u NT, i to dovoženi preko teritorija HVO Travnik, u bolnici ostao dio našeg osoblja (jedan dio otišo u bolnicu NB)... svak svoju politiku vodio... slaba organizacija na svim razinama... a ovamo neke naše optužuju za zločinačku orgnizaciju i poduhvat...